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Modern finance has long valued models relating expected returns to factor sensitivities.
A virtue of such models is parsimony. Once factors are constructed, the only additional data
required to compute implied expected returns in standard applications are the historical
returns on the assets being analyzed. Moreover, the number of factors has typically been
small. For many years only a single market factor was popular, following the CAPM of
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). Fama and French (1993) spurred widespread use of three
factors, motivated by violations of the single-factor CAPM related to firm size and value-
versus-growth measures.
Numerous studies have identified anomalies that violate the three-factor model, but only
occasionally have anomalies contended for status as additional factors, given the virtue of
parsimony in a factor model.1 Given the proliferation of anomalies, however, the need for
an alternative factor model that can accommodate more anomalies has become increasingly
clear. Two additional factors have recently received significant attention. Hou, Xue, and
Zhang (2015a) propose a four-factor model that combines market and size factors with two
new factors based on investment and profitability. Fama and French (2015) add somewhat
different versions of investment and profitability factors to their earlier three-factor model
(Fama and French (1993)), creating a five-factor model. Both studies provide theoretical
motivations for why these factors contain information about expected return: Hou, Xue,
and Zhang (2015a) rely on an investment-based pricing model, while Fama and French
(2015) invoke comparative statics of a present-value relation. At the same time, it should be
noted that both investment and profitability are two of the numerous anomalies documented
earlier in the literature.2 In subsequent studies, Fama and French (2016) and Hou, Xue, and
Zhang (2015b) examine their models’ abilities to explain other anomalies.
We take a different approach to factor construction. Instead of having a factor correspond
to a single anomaly, we combine the information in multiple anomalies. Clearly an important
dimension on which a parsimonious factor model is judged is its ability to accommodate
a wide range of anomalies. Our approach exploits that range when forming the factors.
Rather than construct a factor using stocks’ rankings on a single anomaly variable, such
as investment, we construct a factor by averaging rankings across multiple anomalies. By
averaging, we aim to achieve a less noisy measure of a stock’s mispricing, thereby identifying
1A notable example subsequent to Fama and French (1993) is the momentum anomaly documented by
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), which motivates the frequently used momentum factor proposed by Carhart
(1997).
2Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Xing (2008) show that high investment predicts abnormally low
returns, while Fama and French (2006), Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2010), and Novy-Marx (2013) show
that high profitability predicts abnormally high returns.
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more precisely which stocks to long and which stocks to short when constructing a factor
that can better accommodate anomalies reflecting mispricing.
We apply our approach by constructing two factors from the set of 11 prominent anomalies
examined by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012, 2014, 2015). In constructing the factors, we
average rankings within two clusters of anomalies formed by grouping together the anomalies
exhibiting the greatest similarity. We can measure similarity either by time-series correlations
of anomalies’ long-short return spreads or by cross-sectional correlations of stocks’ rankings
on the anomaly variables. Both measures yield the same two clusters of anomalies. The two
mispricing factors are then combined with market and size factors to obtain a four-factor
model.
Our model’s overall ability to accommodate anomalies exceeds that of both the four-
factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a) and the five-factor model of Fama and French
(2015). This conclusion obtains not only within the set of anomalies used to construct the
factors but also for the substantially larger set of 73 anomalies examined previously by Hou,
Xue, and Zhang (2015a, 2015b). For example, when applied to the 51 of those anomalies
having data over our entire sample period, the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (1989) test of whether
all the anomalies’ alphas equal zero produces a p-value of 0.10 for our model compared to
0.003 or less for these four- and five-factor alternative models. Our model also performs
better than these alternatives when the models are judged by their abilities to explain each
other’s factors. As discussed by Barillas and Shanken (2015a, 2015b), judging factor models
this way is implied by standard model-comparison procedures, under both frequentist and
Bayesian approaches. We apply both approaches in our comparisons.
We also construct a three-factor model by replacing our two mispricing factors with a
single factor that averages rankings across the entire set of 11 anomalies, rather than within
two clusters in that set. When models are again judged by their abilities to explain each
other’s factors, this three-factor model outperforms the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and
Zhang (2015a) and the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015). It also outperforms
the latter model in explaining anomalies.
Our size factor is constructed using stocks least likely to be mispriced, as identified
by the measures used to construct our mispricing factors. Our resulting SMB delivers a
small-firm premium of 46 bps per month over our 1967–2013 sample period, nearly twice
the premium of 25 bps implied by the familiar SMB factor in the Fama-French three-
factor model. Consistent with mispricing exerting less effect on our size factor, the investor
sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) exhibits significant ability to predict the Fama-
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French SMB but not our SMB.
The basic concepts motivating our approach are that anomalies in part reflect mispricing
and that mispricing has common components across stocks. Both concepts are consistent
with previous evidence. As we discuss, a large empirical literature links anomalies to mispric-
ing, and numerous studies find pervasive effects often characterized as investor sentiment.
By combining information across anomalies, we aim to construct factors capturing common
elements of mispricing. Consistent with this intent, we find that investor sentiment predicts
our mispricing factors, especially their short legs. The stronger predictability of the short
legs is consistent with asymmetry in the ease of buying versus shorting (e.g., Stambaugh,
Yu, and Yuan (2012)).
Factor models can be useful whether expected returns reflect risk or mispricing. Factors
can capture systematic risks for which investors require compensation, or they can cap-
ture common sources of mispricing, such as market-wide investor sentiment. This point is
emphasized, for example, by Hirshleifer and Jiang (2010) and Kozak, Nagel, and Santosh
(2015). Moreover, there need not be a clean distinction between mispricing and risk com-
pensation as alternative motivations for factor models of expected return. For example,
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (1990) explain how fluctuations in market-wide
“noise-trader” sentiment create an additional source of systematic risk for which rational
traders require compensation.
When expected returns reflect mispricing and not just compensation for systematic risks,
some of the mispricing may not be driven by pervasive sentiment factors but may instead
be asset specific, as discussed for example by Daniel and Titman (1997). In that sense the
concept of “mispricing factors” potentially embeds some inconsistency. On the other hand,
previous studies discussed below do find that mispricing appears to exhibit commonality
across stocks. The extent to which our factors help describe expected returns is an empirical
question. A parsimonious factor model that outperforms feasible alternatives seems useful
from a practical perspective, as no model can be entirely correct.
One practical use of factor models, in addition to explaining expected returns, is to
capture systematic time-series variation in realized returns. We also examine the extent
to which our mispricing factors can perform this role as compared to the factors in the
alternative models we consider. Our results indicate that the ability of mispricing factors to
explain expected returns better (i.e., to accommodate amomalies better) does not come at
the cost of sacrificing ability to capture return variance.
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 briefly discusses the consid-
erable evidence linking anomalies to mispricing and to pervasive sentiment effects. Section
2 explains the construction of our two mispricing factors and our size factor and examines
their empirical properties. The resulting four-factor model is compared to notable alterna-
tive factor models in Section 3. Section 4 considers a model with just a single mispricing
factor. Section 5 illustrates a shared limitation of the factor models, showing how they can
seem to explain the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle if the role of mispricing is not considered.
Section 6 reviews our conclusions.
1. Anomalies, Mispricing, and Sentiment
Much of the return-anomaly literature, too extensive for us to survey comprehensively, points
to mispricing as being at least partially responsible for the documented anomalous returns.
We base our mispricing factors on a prominent subset of the many anomalies reported in
the literature, and, within this subset, studies containing mispricing interpretations include
Ritter (1991) for net stock issues, Daniel and Titman (2006) for composite equity issues,
Sloan (1996) for accruals, Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004) for net operating as-
sets, Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) for asset growth, Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) for
investment-to-assets, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) for financial distress, Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993) for momentum, and Wang and Yu (2013) for profitability anomalies in-
cluding return on assets and gross profitability. A mispricing interpretation of anomalies
is also consistent with the evidence of McLean and Pontiff (2015), who observe that fol-
lowing an anomaly’s academic publication, there is greater trading activity in the anomaly
portfolios, and anomaly profits decline.
Idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) represents risk that deters price-correcting arbitrage. This
concept is advanced, for example, by DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman (1990),
Pontiff (1996), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015). One should
therefore expect stronger anomaly returns among stocks with higher IVOL. Studies finding
that various return anomalies are indeed stronger among high-IVOL stocks include Pontiff
(1996) for closed-end fund discounts, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) for index inclusions,
Mendenhall (2004) for post-earnings announcement drift, Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003)
for the value premium, Zhang (2006) for momentum, Mashruwala, Rajgopal, and Shevlin
(2006) for accruals, Scruggs (2007) for “Siamese twin” stocks, Ben-David and Roulstone
(2010) for insider trades and share repurchases, McLean (2010) for long-term reversal, Li
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and Zhang (2010) for asset growth and investment to assets, Larrain and Varas (2013) for
equity issuance, and Wang and Yu (2013) for return on assets.
As explained by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015), if there is less arbitrage capital
available to short overpriced stocks than to purchase underpriced stocks, then the effect
of IVOL should be larger among overpriced stocks. Jin (2013) examines ten anomaly long-
short spreads and finds all to be more profitable among high-IVOL stocks than among
low-IVOL stocks, and this difference is attributable primarily to the short leg of each spread.
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) find, consistent with arbitrage risk and mispricing, that the
IVOL-return relation is negative among overpriced stocks but positive among underpriced
stocks, with mispricing determined by combining the same 11 return anomalies used in this
study. Moreover, those authors find that the negative IVOL-return relation among overpriced
stocks is stronger than the positive relation among underpriced stocks, consistent with the
arbitrage asymmetry in buying versus shorting.
When mispricing is present, stocks that are more difficult to short should also be those
for which overpricing is less easily corrected. Evidence that short-leg profits of anomaly
long-short spreads are indeed greater among stocks with greater shorting impediments is
provided by Nagel (2005), Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu (2011), Avramov, Chordia, Jostova,
and Philipov (2013), Drechsler and Drechsler (2014), and Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015).
The last study also shows that the negative IVOL-return relation among overpriced stocks
is stronger among stocks less easily shorted.
Evidence consistent with a common sentiment-related component of mispricing is pro-
vided, for example, by Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012).3
The latter study finds that the short-leg returns for long-short spreads associated with each
of 11 anomalies we use in this study are significantly lower following a high level of investor
sentiment as measured by the Baker-Wurgler sentiment index. Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan
(2015) find that the negative (positive) IVOL-return relation among overpriced (underpriced)
stocks is stronger following a high (low) level of the Baker-Wurgler index, consistent with
arbitrage risk deterring the correction of sentiment-related mispricing.
This study’s objective is not to make a case for the presence of mispricing in the stock
market. For that we rely on the previous literature discussed above. We do, however, provide
two novel results with regard to the role of investor sentiment, as will be discussed later.
First, investor sentiment predicts our mispricing factors, particularly their short (overpriced)
3Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2012) find that sentiment-related effects similar to those documented in the
U.S. by Baker and Wurgler (2006) also occur in a number of other countries.
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legs. Second, unlike the size factor constructed by Fama and French (1993), our size factor—
constructed to be less contaminated by mispricing—is not predicted by sentiment.
2. Anomalies and Factors
Our objective is to explore parsimonious factor models that include factors combining in-
formation from a range of anomalies. We first construct a four-factor model that includes
two mispricing factors along with market and size factors. Later we consider a three-factor
model with just a single mispricing factor.
The first factor in our four-factor model is the excess value-weighted market return, stan-
dard in essentially all factor models with pre-specified factors. Constructing the remaining
three factors—a size factor and two mispricing factors—involves averaging stocks’ rankings
with respect to various anomalies. We use the same 11 anomalies analyzed by Stambaugh,
Yu, and Yuan (2012, 2014, 2015). While the number of anomalies used to construct the
factors could be expanded, we use this previously specified set to alleviate concerns that a
different set was chosen to yield especially favorable results for this study. The Appendix
provides brief descriptions of the 11 anomalies: net stock issues, composite equity issues,
accruals, net operating assets, asset growth, investment-to-assets, distress, O-score, momen-
tum, gross profitability, and return on assets.
Rather than constructing a five-factor model by adding our two mispricing factors to
the three factors of Fama and French (1993), we opt for only four factors. That is, we do
not include a book-to-market factor and instead include only a size factor in addition to
the market and our mispricing factors. Our motivation here is parsimony and long-standing
evidence that firm size is related not only to average return but also to a number of other stock
characteristics such as volatility, liquidity, and sensitivities to macroeconomic conditions.4
Not including a factor based on book-to-market reflects the literature’s less settled view
of that variable’s role and importance. As we report later, our mispricing factors price
the book-to-market factor, suggesting our decision to exclude a book-to-market factor is
reasonable.
4For example, see Banz (1981) on average return, Amihud and Mendelson (1989) on volatility and liq-
uidity, and Chan, Chen, and Hsieh (1985) on sensitivities to macroeconomic conditions.
6
2.1. The Mispricing Factors
We construct factors based on averages of stocks’ anomaly rankings. This approach is easily
motivated. Let α denote a non-zero vector of alphas for a universe of stocks with respect to
a benchmark factor, P .5 That is, α is the intercept vector in the multivariate regression
rt = α + βrP,t + t, (1)
where rt is the vector containing the stocks’ excess returns in period t, and rP,t is the
benchmark’s excess return. Consider a factor Q with return rQ,t = w
′rt, where w is a weight
vector. Suppose that adding rQ,t to the right-hand side of (1) leaves no remaining alphas.
That is, the resulting regression becomes
rt = Θ
[
rP,t
rQ,t
]
+ ηt. (2)
If this additional factor can also produce a covariance matrix for ηt of the form σ
2I , then
setting w proportional to α produces the desired Q, as shown by MacKinlay and Pa´stor
(2000).6 In other words, the additional factor that completes the pricing job is constructed by
going long stocks with positive alphas and short stocks with negative alphas. Our approach
to this long-short construction of Q essentially treats each stock’s cross-sectional ranking with
respect to an anomaly as a noisy proxy for the stock’s alpha ranking. Some of that noise is
diversified away by averaging rankings across anomalies, thereby more precisely indicating
which stocks to buy and which stocks to short when constructing the factor. Excluding
stocks from the middle of the average-ranking distribution, as we do, further increases the
likelihood of making correct long/short classifications when constructing the factor. We term
the resulting factor corresponding to Q a “mispricing” factor, reflecting our view, discussed
earlier, that mispricing is an important element of anomaly-related alphas.
Our approach based on averaging anomaly rankings stands in contrast to previous ap-
proaches that construct a factor by ranking on a single variable that initially gained attention
as a return anomaly. If such a variable is uniquely motivated as capturing either a systematic-
risk sensitivity or mispricing, then our approach simply contaminates that variable with ex-
traneous information. On the other hand, if that variable is not so uniquely valuable, then
our approach can work better. Our empirical results support the latter scenario.
5Assuming a single-factor benchmark is essentially without loss of generality, as P can be viewed as the
maximum-Sharpe-ratio combination of multiple factors.
6Those authors show that when the unique portfolio Z that is orthogonal to P and produces zero alphas
also produces a scalar covariance matrix of residuals, then Z is a combination of P and a portfolio whose
weights are proportional to α, as are the weights in Q. (See in particular their equation 26 on page 891.)
Regressing rt on rP,t and rZ,t therefore produces the same residuals and (zero) intercept vector as does
regressing rt on rP,t and rQ,t.
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As noted earlier, we construct mispricing factors by averaging rankings within the set of
11 prominent anomalies examined by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012, 2014, 2015). The
initial step in constructing two mispricing factors is to separate the 11 anomalies into two
clusters, with a cluster containing the anomalies most similar to each other. Similarity can be
measured by either of two methods, using either time-series correlations of anomaly returns
or average cross-sectional correlations of anomaly rankings. Both methods produce the same
two clusters of anomalies.
In the first method, for each anomaly i we compute the spread, Ri,t, between the value-
weighted returns in month t on stocks in the first and tenth NYSE deciles of the ranking
variable in a sort at the end of month t−1 of all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks with share
prices greater than $5, where the ordering produces a positive estimated intercept in the
regression
Ri,t = αi + biMKTt + ciSMBt + ui,t, (3)
and MKTt and SMBt are the market and size factors constructed by Fama and French
(1993).7 Next we compute the correlation matrix of the estimated residuals in equation (3).
Our sample period runs from January 1967 through December 2013, except data for the
distress anomaly begin in October 1974, and data for the return-on-assets anomaly begin in
November 1971. To deal with the heterogeneous starting dates, we compute the correlation
matrix using the maximum likelihood estimator analyzed by Stambaugh (1997). Using this
correlation matrix, we form two clusters by applying the same procedure as Ahn, Conrad,
and Dittmar (2009), who combine a correlation-based distance measure with the clustering
method of Ward (1963).8
In the second method, we compute the z-score of each stock’s ranking percentile for
each anomaly and then compute the cross-sectional correlations between the z-scores for all
available pairs of the 11 anomalies. This procedure gives a set of correlations each month,
and we average these correlations across the months in our sample period. The resulting
11 × 11 matrix of average correlations is then used to form two clusters using the same
7For the anomaly variables requiring Compustat data from annual financial statements, we require at
least a four-month gap between the end of month t− 1 and the end of the fiscal year. When using quarterly
reported earnings, we use the most recent data for which the reporting date provided by Compustat (item
RDQ) precedes the end of month t−1. When using quarterly items reported from the balance sheet, we use
those reported for the quarter prior to quarter used for reported earnings. The latter treatment allows for
the fact that a significant number of firms do not include include balance-sheet information with earnings
announcements and only later release it in 10-Q filings (see Chen, DeFond, and Park (2002)). For anomalies
requiring return and market capitalization, we use data recorded for month t− 1 and earlier, as reported by
CRSP.
8Using the version of SMB we construct later in subsection 2.2, instead of the Fama-French version of
SMB, does not change any of our cluster-identification results.
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procedure applied above to the correlation matrix of long-short returns.
The first cluster of anomalies includes net stock issues, composite equity issues, accruals,
net operating assets, asset growth, and investment to assets. These six anomaly variables all
represent quantities that firms’ managements can affect rather directly. Thus, we denote the
factor arising from this cluster asMGMT . (The factor construction is described below.) The
second cluster includes distress, O-score, momentum, gross profitability, and return on assets.
These five anomaly variables are related more to performance and less directly controlled
by management, so we denote the factor arising from this cluster as PERF . Although we
assign names to the clusters, we do not suggest that a cluster reflects a single behavioral story.
For example, within the MGMT cluster, equity issuance anomalies could reflect managerial
action triggered by mispricing (e.g., Daniel and Titman (2006)), while asset growth and
investment anomalies could reflect mispricing triggered by managerial action (e.g., Cooper,
Gulen, and Schill (2008)). Moreover, even within the issuance anomalies, multiple effects
could be at work, as the results of Greenwood and Hanson (2012) suggest. While there may
exist unifying behavioral themes underlying the identities of our clusters, discovering such a
framework is beyond the scope of our study.
We next average a stock’s rankings with respect to the available anomaly measures within
each of the two clusters. Thus, each month a stock has two composite mispricing measures,
P1 and P2. Our averaging of anomaly rankings closely follows the approach of Stambaugh,
Yu, and Yuan (2015), who construct a single composite mispricing measure by averaging
across all 11 anomalies.9 As in that study, we equally weight a stock’s rankings across
anomalies—a weighting that is simple, transparent, and not sample-dependent. As dis-
cussed earlier, the rationale for averaging is that, through diversification, a stock’s average
rank yields a less noisy measure of its mispricing than does its rank with respect to any
single anomaly. The evidence suggests that such diversification is effective. As observed by
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015), the spread between the alphas for portfolios of stocks in
the top and bottom deciles of the average ranking across the 11 anomalies is nearly twice
the average across those anomalies of the spread between the top- and bottom-decile alphas
of portfolios formed using an individual anomaly (with alphas computed using the three-
factor model of Fama and French (1993)). We verify a similar result in our sample: The
former spread is 95 basis points per month while the latter spread is 53 basis points, and
the difference of 42 basis points has a t-statistic of 3.80.
9Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) also report a robustness exercise that employs a clustering approach
similar to that reported above.
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We construct the mispricing factors by applying a 2 × 3 sorting procedure resembling
that of Fama and French (2015). The approach in that study generalizes the approach in
Fama and French (1993), and a similar procedure is applied in Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a).
Specifically, each month we sort NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (excluding those with
prices less than $5) by size (equity market capitalization) and split them into two groups
using the NYSE median size as the breakpoint. Independently, we sort all stocks by P1
and assign them to three groups using as breakpoints the 20th and 80th percentiles of the
combined NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ universe. We similarly assign stocks to three groups
according to sorts on P2. To construct the first mispricing factor, MGMT , we compute
value-weighted returns on each of the four portfolios formed by the intersection of the two
size categories with the top and bottom categories for P1. The value of MGMT for a given
month is then the simple average of the returns on the two low-P1 portfolios (underpriced
stocks) minus the average of the returns on the two high-P1 portfolios (overpriced stocks).
The second mispricing factor, PERF , is similarly constructed from the low- and high-P2
portfolios.
The persistence of the measures used to construct our mispricing factors is similar to
that of measures used to form other familiar factors. A simple gauge of persistence is the
time-series average of the cross-sectional correlation between a given measure’s rankings
in adjacent months. This average correlation equals 0.955 and 0.965 for the composite
mispricing measures used to construct MGMT and PERF . The measures used to form
the book-to-market, investment, and profitability factors in Fama and French (2015) have
average rank correlations of 0.983, 0.943, and 0.981, respectively. Hou, Xue, and Zhang
(2015a) construct essentially the same investment factor, while their somewhat different
profitability factor uses a measure whose average rank correlation is 0.883. In comparison,
market capitalization of equity, used to construct the size factors in all of the above models,
has an average rank correlation of 0.996.
One might note that for the breakpoints of P1 and P2, we use the 20th and 80th per-
centiles of the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ, rather than the 30th and 70th percentiles of the
NYSE, used by the studies cited above that apply a similar procedure to different variables.
These modifications reflect the notion that relative mispricing in the cross-section is likely
to be more a property of the extremes than of the middle. Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015)
find, for example, that the negative (positive) effects of idiosyncratic volatility for overpriced
(underpriced) stocks are consistent with the role of arbitrage risk deterring the correction
of mispricing, and those authors show that such effects occur primarily in the extremes of a
composite mispricing measure and are stronger for smaller stocks. Subsection 3.4 explains
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that our main results are robust to the various deviations we take from the more conventional
factor-construction methodology tracing to Fama and French (1993). The online appendix
reports detailed results of those robustness checks.
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations for monthly series of the
four factors in our model. (The construction of our size factor, SMB, is explained below.)
We see that the two mispricing factors, MGMT and PERF , have zero correlation with
each other (to two digits) in our overall 1976–2013 sample period. That is, the clustering
procedure, coupled with the averaging of individual anomaly rankings, essentially produces
two orthogonal factors.
2.2. The Size Factor
When constructing our size factor, we depart more significantly from the approach in Fama
and French (2015) and other studies cited above. The stocks we use to form the size factor in
a given month are the stocks not used in forming either of the mispricing factors. Specifically,
to construct our size factor, SMB (small minus big—that notation we keep), we compute
the return on the small-cap leg as the value-weighted portfolio of stocks present in the
intersection of both small-cap middle groups when sorting on P1 and P2. Similarly, the
large-cap leg is the value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the intersection of the large-cap
middle groups in the sorts on the mispricing measures. The value of SMB in a given month
is the return on the small-cap leg minus the large-cap return.
Each 2 × 3 sort on size and one of the mispricing measures produces six categories, so
in total twelve categories result from the sorts using each of the two mispricing measures.
If we were to follow the more familiar approach of Fama and French (2015) and others, we
would compute SMB as the simple average of the value-weighted returns on the six small-
cap portfolios minus the corresponding average of returns on the six large-cap portfolios. By
averaging across the three mispricing categories, that approach would seek to neutralize the
effects of mispricing when computing the size factor. The problem is that such a neutraliza-
tion can be thwarted by arbitrage asymmetry—a greater ability or willingness to buy than
to short for many investors. With such asymmetry, the mispricing within the overpriced
category is likely to be more severe than the mispricing within the underpriced category.
Moreover, this asymmetry is likely to be greater for small stocks than for large ones, given
that small stocks present potential arbitrageurs with greater risk (e.g., idiosyncratic volatil-
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ity).10 Thus, simply averaging across mispricing categories would not neutralize the effects
of mispricing, and the resulting SMB would have an overpricing bias. This bias is a concern
not just when sorting on our mispricing measures but when sorting on any measure that is
potentially associated with mispricing. Some studies argue that book-to-market, for exam-
ple, contains a mispricing effect (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994)), so one might
raise a similar concern in the context of the version of SMB computed by Fama and French
(1993). By instead computing SMB using stocks only from the middle of our mispricing
sorts, avoiding the extremes, we aim to reduce this effect of arbitrage asymmetry.
Consistent with the above argument, our approach delivers a small-cap premium that
significantly exceeds not only the value produced by the above alternative method but also
the small-cap premium implied by the version of SMB in the three-factor model of Fama and
French (1993). For our sample period of January 1967 through December 2013, our SMB
factor has an average of 46 bps per month. In contrast, the alternative method discussed
above gives an SMB with an average of 28 bps, close to the average of 25 bps for the
three-factor Fama-French version of SMB. The differences between our estimated small-cap
premium and these alternatives are significant not only statistically (t-statistics: 3.99 and
4.19) but economically as well, indicating a size premium that is nearly twice that implied by
the familiar Fama-French version of SMB. This result is similar to the conclusion of Asness,
Frazzini, Israel, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2015), who find that the size premium becomes
substantially greater when controlling for other stock characteristics potentially associated
with mispricing. Those authors conclude that explaining a significant size premium presents
a challenge to asset pricing theory. Such a challenge is beyond the scope of our study as
well. Even though the size premium is a fundamentally important quantity, our comparison
below of factor models’ abilities to explain anomalies is not sensitive to the method used
to construct the size factor. (We present further discussion and evidence of this point in
subsection 3.4 and in the online appendix.)
Our procedure also appears to have minimal effect on the distribution of firm sizes used
in computing SMB. For example, if we first compute the value-weighted average of log size
(with size in $1000) for the six small-cap portfolios described above in the more familiar
approach, and we then take the simple average of those six values (analogously to what is
done with returns), the result is 12.28. If we instead compute the value-weighted average of
log size for the firms in the small-cap leg of our SMB, the result is 12.31, nearly identical.
The same comparison for large firms gives 15.81 for the more familiar approach versus 15.83
for the firms in the large-cap leg of our SMB.
10See Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) for supporting evidence.
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One might ask whether the same approach we take in constructing the size factor—
excluding stocks more likely to be mispriced—matters for constructing other factors as well.
For example, one could follow this approach when constructing a book-to-market factor. We
explore this question for that factor in particular and do find a substantial effect. Specifically,
we separate stocks into six groups, following the same procedure as Fama and French (1993),
but then before computing value-weighted returns within each group and forming the HML
factor, we delete the stocks in the top 20% and bottom 20% of either of our mispricing
measures. This additional step renders the value premium 40 percent smaller and statistically
insignificant.11
2.3. Factor Betas, Arbitrage Asymmetry, and Sentiment Effects
Table 2 gives parameter estimates from our four-factor model for the individual long-short
strategies based on the anomaly measures used above as well as book-to-market. Panel A
contains the alphas and factor sensitivities (“betas”) of the long-short spreads between the
value-weighted portfolios of stocks in the long leg (bottom decile) and short leg (top decile).
Panel B gives corresponding estimates for the long legs, and Panel C reports estimates for
the short legs. The breakpoints are based on NYSE deciles, but all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ
stocks with share prices of at least $5 are included.12 For anomalies in the first cluster, the
long-short betas on the first mispricing factor,MGMT , are positive with t-statistics between
6.09 and 18.12, whereas the same anomalies’ long-short betas on the second factor, PERF ,
are uniformly lower and have t-statistics of mixed signs that average just 1.27. Similarly, for
anomalies in the second cluster, the long-short betas on PERF are positive with t-statistics
between 5.02 and 24.10, while the betas on MGMT have mixed-sign t-statistics averaging
−0.17. These results confirm that averaging anomaly rankings within a cluster produces
a factor that captures common variation in returns for the anomalies in that cluster. Not
surprisingly, for each anomaly with respect to its corresponding factor, the short-leg beta
is significantly negative and the long-leg beta is significantly positive, with the long leg for
accruals being the only exception.
Also observe in Table 2 that the short-leg betas are generally larger in absolute magnitude
than their long-leg counterparts. With the first-cluster anomalies, for example, the average
short-legMGMT beta is−0.46, whereas the average long-legMGMT beta is 0.20. Similarly,
11For our sample period, the monthly average of this alternative book-to-market factor is 0.22% with a
t-statistic of 1.81, whereas the Fama-French HML factor has an average of 0.37% with a t-statistic of 3.01.
12NYSE breakpoints are also used, for example, by Fama and French (2016) and Hou, Xue, and Zhang
(2015a).
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for the second-cluster anomalies, the short-leg PERF betas average −0.49 as compared to
0.30 for the long legs. If the factors indeed capture systematic components of mispricing, a
greater short-leg sensitivity is consistent with the arbitrage asymmetry discussed above. This
arbitrage asymmetry leaves more uncorrected overpricing than uncorrected underpricing,
implying greater sensitivity to systematic mispricing for overpriced (short-leg) stocks than
for uncerpriced (long-leg) stocks.
Arbitrage asymmetry is also consistent with the relation between investor sentiment and
anomaly returns. For each of the anomalies we use to construct our factors, Stambaugh, Yu,
and Yuan (2012) observe that the short leg of the long-short anomaly spread is significantly
more profitable following high investor sentiment, whereas the long-leg profits are less sen-
sitive to sentiment. We observe similar sentiment effects for our mispricing factors. Table 3
reports the results of regressing each factor as well as its long and short legs on the previous
month’s level of the investor sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006).13 For the two
mispricing factors, MGMT and PERF , the slope coefficients on both the long and short
legs are uniformly negative, consistent with sentiment effects, but the slopes for the short
legs are two to three times larger in magnitude. The short-leg coefficients for the two factors
are nearly identical, as are the t-statistics of −2.06 and −2.05. The long-leg t-statistics, in
contrast, are just −0.98 and −1.29.
The stronger sentiment effects for the short legs ofMGMT and PERF can be understood
in the context of the study by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), who find that the short-
leg returns of each of the same 11 anomalies used here are significantly lower following
high sentiment. Unlike that study’s long-short spreads, MGMT and PERF reflect average
anomaly rankings and include more than just the top and bottom deciles, but it is not
surprising our results are nevertheless similar. As that study explains, given that many
investors are less willing or able to short stocks than to buy them, overpricing resulting from
high investor sentiment gets corrected less by arbitrage than does underpricing resulting
from low sentiment. Sentiment therefore exhibits a stronger relation to short-leg anomaly
returns than to long-leg returns. The significantly positive t-statistics in Table 3 for the
sentiment sensitivity of each long-short difference (i.e., each mispricing factor) confirm the
greater sentiment effect on the short-leg returns. Overall, the long-short asymmetry in factor
betas (Table 2) and sentiment effects (Table 3) is consistent with a mispricing interpretation
of our factors.
13Because investor sentiment can be correlated with economic conditions (e.g., investors can be excessively
optimistic when times are good), we use the raw sentiment index produced by Baker and Wurgler (2006)
rather than version they orthogonalize with respect to macro factors.
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Sentiment does not exhibit much ability to predict our size factor. In Table 3, the t-
statistic is −1.60 for the slope coefficient when regressing the long-short spread (SMB) on
lagged sentiment, and the t-statistics for the long and short legs (small and large firms) are
−1.72 and −1.17. If sentiment affects prices, then periods of high (low) sentiment are likely
to be followed by especially low (high) returns on overpriced (underpriced) stocks, especially
among smaller stocks, which are likely to be more susceptible to mispricing. Baker and
Wurgler (2006) report evidence consistent with this hypothesis, which implies a negative
relation between lagged sentiment and the return on a spread that is long small stocks and
short large stocks—if mispriced stocks are included, especially in the small-stock leg. The
lack of a significant relation between our SMB factor and sentiment suggests some success
in our attempt to avoid mispriced stocks when constructing the factor. In contrast, for
example, sentiment does exhibit a significant ability to predict the familiar SMB factor
from the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993). The slope coefficient is nearly 50%
greater in magnitude (−0.32 versus −0.22) and has a t-statistic of −2.31. In fact, the t-
statistic for the difference in slopes of −0.10 is −1.68, which is significant at the 5% level for
the one-tailed test implied by the alternative hypothesis that our SMB factor is less affected
by mispricing.
Our labeling of MGMT and PERF as “mispricing” factors is not what distinguishes
them from factors in other models. For example, the investment and profitability factors in
the models of Fama and French (2015) and Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a) can also reflect
mispricing. While both of those studies provide models linking investment and profitability
to expected return, their models do not distinguish rational risk-based compensation versus
mispricing as the source of expected return. The latter could well be at work: when the
short-leg returns of those factors (two from each study) are regressed on lagged investor
sentiment, the t-statistics lie between −1.93 and −2.36, consistent with both the results and
mispricing interpretation in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012). As explained earlier, what
instead distinguishes our factors is that they are based on combining the information in
multiple anomalies, as opposed to being single-anomaly factors.
3. Comparing Factor Models
Fama and French (2016) explore the ability of the five-factor model of Fama and French
(2015) to accommodate various return anomalies. Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015b) compare
that model to the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a) by investigating the two
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models’ abilities to explain a range of anomalies. We evaluate our four-factor model relative
to both of those models, also including the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) in
the comparison as a familiar benchmark.14 In subsection 3.1, we compare the models’ relative
abilities to explain a range of individual anomalies, both the set of 12 anomalies examined
in Table 2 as well as the substantially wider set of 73 anomalies analyzed by Hou, Xue,
and Zhang (2015a, 2015b). Subsection 3.2 then reports pairwise model comparisons that
evaluate each model’s ability to explain factors present in another. Subsection 3.3 compares
models using Bayesian posterior model probabilities. Results of robustness investigations are
summarized in subsection 3.4 (with details reported in the online appendix). Subsection 3.5
compares the abilities of the factor models to explain return variance for a variety of stock
portfolios.
3.1. Comparing models’ abilities to explain anomalies
Table 4 reports alphas from the various factor models for each of the 11 anomalies used in
our factors plus book-to-market. For convenience, we denote the factor models as follows:
FF-3: three-factor model of Fama and French (1993)
FF-5: five-factor model of Fama and French (2015)
q-4: four-factor “q-factor” model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a)
M-4: four-factor mispricing-factor model introduced here
For each anomaly, we construct the difference between the value-weighted monthly return on
stocks ranked in the bottom decile and the return on those in the top decile. (The highest
rank corresponds to the lowest three-factor Fama-French (1993) alpha.) We then use each
long-short return as the dependent variable in 12 regressions of the form
Ri,t = αi +
K∑
j=1
βi,jFj,t + ui,t, (4)
where the Fj,t’s are the K factors in a given model. Panel A reports the estimated αi’s for
each model. Also reported (first column) are the averages of the Ri,t’s. Panel B reports the
corresponding t-statistics.
The alternative models—FF-3, FF-5, and q-4—exhibit at best only modest ability to
accommodate the anomalies. Consistent with having been identified as anomalies with re-
spect to the FF-3 model, the first 11 anomalies in Table 4 (i.e., excluding book-to-market)
14We are grateful to all of these authors for providing time series of their factors.
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produce FF-3 alphas that are significant both economically and statistically. The monthly
alphas for those anomalies range from 0.32% (asset growth) to 1.59% (momentum), and
the t-statistics range from 2.83 to 5.70. Model FF-5 lowers all but one of the FF-3 alphas
for those anomalies, but only the alpha for asset growth—essentially the investment factor
in FF-5—drops to insignificance (0.06%, t-statistic: 0.58). Ten alphas remain economically
and statistically significant, ranging from 0.32% (net stock issues) to 1.35% (momentum),
with the t-statistics ranging from 2.29 to 4.12. Model q-4 does a somewhat better job than
FF-5. Asset growth—also essentially the investment factor in q-4—is similarly accommo-
dated, while the alphas on three additional anomalies—distress, momentum, and return on
assets—drop to levels insignificant from at least a statistical perspective (t-statistics rang-
ing from 0.72 to 1.40). At the same time, though, seven anomalies have both economically
and statistically significant q-4 alphas ranging from 0.32% (investment to assets) to 0.65%
(accruals), with t-statistics ranging from 2.50 to 4.30.
Model M-4, true to its intent, does the best job of accommodating the anomalies. Of the
nine positive M-4 alphas, all but one are lower than any of the corresponding alphas for the
other models. The sole exception is return on assets, for which model q-4 produces a smaller
alpha (0.10% versus 0.27%)—unsurprising given that model q-4 includes a profitability fac-
tor. Only two of the M-4 t-statistics exceed 2.0 (a third has a t-statistic of 1.90). The alphas
for asset growth and distress flip to negative values in model M-4 (with t-statistics of −1.96
and −1.03).
Table 5 compares the models on several measures that summarize abilities to accom-
modate the set of anomaly long-short spreads: average absolute alpha, average absolute
t-statistic of alpha, the number of anomalies for which the model produces the lowest ab-
solute alpha among the four models being compared, and the Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken
(1989) “GRS” test of whether all alphas equal zero.15 Panel A reports these measures for
the set of 12 anomalies examined above. Because two of the anomaly series start at later
dates than the others, as noted earlier, we compute two versions of the GRS test. The
first, denoted GRS10, uses the ten anomalies with full-length histories. The second, GRS12,
15For T time-series observations on the N long-short spreads and the K factors, define the multivariate
regression R = XΘ + U, where R and U are T × N , X is T × (K + 1) and Θ is (K + 1) × N . The first
column of X contains ones, and the remainingK columns contain the factors. The least-squares estimator is
Θˆ = (X′X)−1X′R, where the first row of Θˆ, transposed to a column vector, is the N ×1 vector αˆ. Compute
the unbiased residual covariance-matrix estimator, Σˆ = 1
T−K−1
(R−XΘˆ)′(R−XΘˆ), and let ω1,1 denote the
1,1 element of (X′X)−1. Then
F =
T −N −K
N(T −K − 1)
αˆ′Σˆ−1αˆ/ω1,1
has an F distribution with degrees of freedom N and T −N −K.
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uses all of the anomalies for the shorter sample period with complete data on all 12. The
relative performance of the models is consistent across all of the summary measures.16 For
each measure, we see M-4 performs best, followed in decreasing order of performance by q-4,
FF-5, and FF-3. (The values in the first column correspond to a zero-factor model, with
alphas equal to average excess returns.) The average absolute alpha of 0.18% for M-4 is
about half of the next best value of 0.34%, achieved by q-4, and slightly more than a third
of the 0.45% value for FF-5. The average absolute t-statistics follow a similar pattern, with
M-4 having an average of only 1.29, compared to values of 2.34 and 2.93 for q-4 and FF-5.
For nine of the anomalies, model M-4 achieves the lowest absolute alpha, compared to two
anomalies for model q-4, one for FF-5, and none for FF-3. The GRS tests, if judged by the
p-values, deliver perhaps the sharpest differences between M-4 and the other models. For
example, for M-4 the GRS10 test produces a p-value of 0.05. In other words, at a significance
level of 5% or less, the test does not reject the hypothesis that all ten full-sample anomalies
are accommodated by this four-factor model. In contrast, the corresponding p-value is only
0.00000001 for q-4 and just 0.0000000007 for FF-5. For the GRS12 test the M-4 p-value is
0.03, but the p-values for q-4 and FF-5 are just 0.000008 and 0.000006.
We next examine a substantially larger set of anomalies. One reason for doing so rec-
ognizes the potential advantage that M-4 may have when pricing a set of 12 anomalies of
which 11 are used to construct the model’s factors. The factors in the models to which
we compare M-4 are also constructed from essentially that same set of 12 anomalies, but
fewer of the anomalies are used. Thus, M-4 may have a relative advantage in pricing the 12
anomalies analogous the advantage enjoyed by the FF-3 factors when pricing the set of 25
size- and book-to-market-sorted portfolios in Fama and French (1993). The latter advantage
is analyzed by Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010).
Panels B and C of Table 5 report the same measures as Panel A but for the 73 anomalies
examined by Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a, 2015b). Those authors construct two sets of long-
short returns for each anomaly. The first set, analyzed in Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), uses
NYSE deciles as the breakpoints for allocating stocks in forming value-weighted portfolios.
The second set, constructed in Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015b), excludes stocks with mar-
ket capitalizations below the NYSE 20th percentile and then uses deciles of the remaining
16The consistency in results, here and later, for comparisons of |α| as well as the t and F statistics reflects
the similarity in the various models’ abilities to explain time-series variance of anomaly returns. Otherwise,
models that explain substantially greater variance could produce smaller alpha magnitudes accompanied by
stronger rejections (e.g., Fama and French (1993)).
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NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ universe to form equally weighted portfolios.17
Panel B of Table 5 reports results for the first set of long-short spreads for the 73 anoma-
lies. Here again we compute two GRS tests, one with the 51 anomalies whose data begin by
January 1967, and another with the 72 anomalies with data beginning by February 1986.18
The relative performance of the three models is the same as for the smaller set of anomalies
analyzed in Panel A: model M-4 performs best, followed in order by q-4, FF-5, and FF-3.
While the margin between M-4 and q-4 narrows somewhat, M-4 again has a smaller absolute
alpha (0.18 versus 0.20) and a smaller absolute t-statistic (0.99 versus 1.15), and M-4 pro-
duces lower absolute alphas for nearly twice as many anomalies (37 versus 19). Model M-4
again does better on the GRS test as well. For the test with the set of full-sample anomalies,
GRS51 delivers p-value for model M-4 of 0.10, failing to reject the hypothesis that all 51
anomalies are accommodated by the model. In contrast, the corresponding q-4 p-value is
0.003.
Panel C of Table 5 reports results using the second set of 73 long-short spreads. Models
q-4 and M-4 are closer here, but model M-4 again produces the lowest average absolute alpha
(0.22 versus 0.23) and average absolute t-statistic (1.38 versus 1.44), and it achieves a lower
absolute alpha on more anomalies (32 versus 23). The GRS statistics are very close, with
each of models q-4 and M-4 doing slightly better on one of the two. Both models again enjoy
substantial margins over FF-5 and FF-3.
Given that model q-4 is the closest competitor to model M-4 in Table 5, we also consider
a modified challenge. Specifically, we reduce the set of 73 anomalies by excluding those
most highly correlated with the factors in these two models. For each of four factors—those
in models q-4 and M-4 other than the market and size factors—the five anomalies whose
long-short returns are most highly correlated with the factor are eliminated. This procedure
could eliminate up to 20 anomalies, but somewhat fewer are actually eliminated due to some
overlap across factors. (The anomalies eliminated are detailed in the Appendix.)
When using the first set of 73 long-short returns analyzed in Panel B of Table 5, 16
anomalies are eliminated, and the results using the remaining 57 are reported in Panel A of
Table 6. For the second set of long-short returns analyzed in Panel C of Table 5, 19 anomalies
are eliminated, and Panel B of Table 6 presents results for the remaining 54 anomalies. The
17The Appendix lists the 73 anomalies. We are grateful to the authors for generously providing us with
both sets of these data.
18The reason for using only 72 anomalies instead of 73 is that the data for one anomaly, corporate
governance (G), are available only from September 1990 through December 2006, so we exclude it to avoid
substantially shortening the sample period for the GRS tests.
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results in Table 6 deliver essentially the same message as those in Table 5, though the margin
of M-4 over q-4 increases a bit. In Panel A of Table 6, as compared to Panel B of Table 5, the
gap widens for the average absolute t-statistic. In addition, M-4 produces p-values for the
GRS statistic of 0.13 and 0.01, whereas those for q-4 are less than 0.01. In the head-to-head
comparison of q-4 and M-4 shown in the last row, M-4 produces the smallest alpha for 36 of
the 57 anomalies, compared to 21 for q-4.
For the second set of 73 anomalies, in Panel B of Table 6, as compared to Panel C of
Table 5, the gaps for the average absolute alpha and t-statistic widen slightly, while the
GRS statistics for q-4 and M-4 are again close, with the latter slightly better on the set of 40
anomalies with longer histories and the former slightly better on the set of 53 with shorter
histories. In the comparison of q-4 to M-4 in the last row, M-4 produces the smallest alpha
for 33 of the 54 anomalies, compared to 21 for q-4. As before, the margin of M-4 over q-4 is
generally smaller than the margin of q-4 over FF-5 and FF-3.
Two additional four-factor models are used in a number of studies. The model of Carhart
(1997), MOM-4, adds a momentum factor to FF-3, while the model of Pa´stor and Stam-
baugh (2003), LIQ-4, adds a liquidity factor. Including a liquidity factor barely improves,
at best, the three-factor model’s ability to explain anomalies. This outcome is perhaps un-
surprising, as LIQ-4 is the only model of the six considered here whose additional factor is
not formed by ranking on a characteristic producing a return anomaly in an earlier study.19
The improvement over FF-3 produced by MOM-4 is greater than what LIQ-4 produces, but
the ability to explain anomalies falls short of that for M-4, q-4, and, generally, FF-5. The
results with MOM-4 and LIQ-4 are reported in the online appendix.
3.2. Comparing models’ abilities to explain each other’s factors
We next investigate whether the factors unique to one model produce non-zero alphas with
respect to another model. That is, we explore the extent to which one model can price the
factors of the other. Panel A of Table 7 reports the alphas and corresponding t-statistics for
(i) the FF-5 factors HML (book-to-market), RMW (profitability), and CMA (investment),
(ii) the q-4 factors I/A (investment) and ROE (profitability), and (iii) the M-4 factors
MGMT and PERF . For each of these three sets, Panel B reports the GRS statistic and
19The Pa´stor-Stambaugh (2003) factor is constructed by ranking stocks on their betas with respect to a
market-wide liquidity measure. Such betas were previously unexamined in the literature, and as Pa´stor and
Stambaugh explain, they are quite distinct, both conceptually and empirically, from measures of individual
stock liquidity. The latter have also been related to average returns (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1989)).
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p-value testing whether all of the alphas with respect to an alternative model jointly equal
zero.
Both models q-4 and M-4 appear to price fairly well the three FF-5 factors—HML,
RMW , and CMA. Those factor produce M-4 alphas of 0.11 or less in absolute magnitude,
with t-statistics of 1.35 or less in magnitude. The GRS p-value equals 0.58 for the test of
whether all three M-4 alphas for HML, RMW , and CMA equal zero. The q-4 model does
even better with the FF-5 factors, producing alphas less than 0.04% in magnitude and a
GRS p-value of 0.87. This latter result seems not so surprising, given that q-4 contains just
different versions of the profitability and investment factors in FF-5.
The FF-5 model fails to price the factors of model M-4 and, somewhat surprisingly, even
the factors of model q-4.20 The FF-5 alphas for the two q-4 factors (I/A and ROE) are
0.12% and 0.45%, with t-statistics of 3.48 and 5.53; the GRS p-value for the joint test is less
than 10−8. The FF-5 alphas for the two M-4 factors are even larger, 0.33% and 0.64%, with
t-statistics of 4.93 and 4.17; the GRS p-value for the joint test is less than 10−10. Overall,
the FF-5 model fares least well in the comparisons reported in Table 7.
The comparison of models q-4 and M-4 in Table 7 provides a more even match in which
M-4 finishes modestly ahead. Model M-4 is unable to price the ROE factor of model q-4; the
alpha estimate is 0.36% with a t-statistic of 4.00. This significant alpha for the profitability
factor of model q-4 seems consistent with the fact that the ROA profitability anomaly is one
of the few anomalies in Table 4 not well accommodated by model M-4. The other q-4 factor
seems not to present a big problem for M-4, as the alpha estimate for I/A is only 0.09%
with a t-statistic of 1.57. In contrast, neither factor of model M-4 is priced by model q-4.
The alpha estimates are 0.36% and 0.35%, with t-statistics of 4.54 and 2.24. The GRS tests
confirm that neither q-4 nor M-4 can price both factors of the other model, as the p-values
are small. At the same time, the rejection is more extreme for model q-4, given its GRS
statistic is 72% larger (and the degrees of freedom are the same in both tests).
In sum, model FF-5 accommodates neither the factors of model q-4 nor those of model
M-4. In contrast, both of those models appear to price the FF-5 factors, in that the latter
factors do not have significant alphas with respect to either model. Models q-4 and M-4 are
more evenly matched, as each fails to price all of the other’s factors. Model M-4 appears to
have the edge, though, in that it accommodates one of the two factors in model q-4 fairly
well, whereas the latter model fails to price either of the factors in model M-4.
20Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015b) also report that model FF-5 fails to price the q-4 factors.
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3.3. Bayesian model comparisons
The analysis in Table 7 discussed above takes a frequentist approach in comparing models’
abilities to explain each other’s factors. Another approach to making this comparison is
Bayesian. The results of such a comparison also favor model M-4 over the alternative factor
models.
Suppose we compare two models, M1 and M2, and before observing the data we assign
probabilities p(M1) and p(M2) to each model being the right one, with p(M1) + p(M2) = 1 .
After observing the data, D, the posterior probability of model i is given by
p(Mi|D) =
p(Mi) · p(D|Mi)
p(M1) · p(D|M1) + p(M2) · p(D|M2)
, (5)
where model i’s marginal likelihood is given by
p(D|Mi) =
∫
θi
p(θi)p(D|θi)dθi, (6)
p(θi) is the prior distribution for model i’s parameters, and p(D|θi) is the likelihood function
for model i. As shown by Barillas and Shanken (2015a), when D includes observations of
the factors in both models (including the market) as well as a common set of “test” assets,
the latter drop out of the computation in (5). Moreover, that study also shows that when
p(θi) follows a form as in Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2000), then p(D|Mi) can be computed
analytically. The key feature of the prior, p(θi), is that it is informative about how large
a Sharpe ratio can be produced by combining a given set of assets, in this case the assets
represented by the model’s factors. Specifically, the prior implies a value for the expected
maximum squared Sharpe ratio, relative to the (observed) Sharpe ratio of the market. We
use the Barillas and Shanken (2015a) analytical results here to compute posterior model
probabilities in the above two-way model comparison. Prior model probabilities of each
model are set to one-half.21
Panel A of Figure 1 displays posterior probabilities in a comparison of model M-4 to
model FF-5. The value on the horizontal axis is the square root of the prior expected maxi-
mum squared Sharpe ratio achievable by combining the model’s factors, [Eprior{S
2
MAX}]
1/2,
divided by the observed Sharpe ratio of the market, SMKT . We see in Panel A that when
21We do not simultaneously compare three or more models, because assigning prior probabilities to models
with differing degrees of similarity becomes more complicated. For example, assigning prior probabilities of
1/3 to each of models FF-5, q-4, and M-4 seems unreasonable, in that FF-5 and q-4 are more similar to each
other than to M-4, as both FF-5 and q-4 include profitability and investment factors. For a category-based
approach to such a problem, see Barillas and Shanken (2015a).
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this Sharpe-ratio multiplier is only 1.01 or so, corresponding to a prior expectation that the
market’s Sharpe ratio can be improved only very modestly, the data favor FF-5. The model
probabilities are about equal for a multiplier of 1.05, and then the probability of M-4 rises
steeply for higher values, to nearly 1.0 for multipliers of 1.1 or higher. In other words, when
the prior admits more than very modest improvement over the market’s Sharpe ratio, the
data strongly favor M-4 over FF-5.
The posterior probabilities in the comparison of models M-4 and q-4 are reported in Panel
B of Figure 1. Here again we see that for smaller values of the Sharpe-ratio multiplier, model
M-4 is less favored than the alternative. The probabilities cross at a multiplier between 1.1
and 1.2, and then the probability of M-4 increases to near 1.0 as the multiplier increases to
2.0 or more. In this Bayesian comparison, as in the earlier comparisons, model q-4 again fares
better than model FF-5 when compared to model M-4, but the latter is strongly favored to
either alternative model if prior beliefs admit a reasonable chance of achieving a substantially
higher Sharpe ratio than that of the market index.
The reason that the other models are favored over M-4 when the Sharpe-ratio multiplier
is low is essentially that the maximum Sharpe ratio produced by the M-4 factors is higher
than for the other models. The Sharpe ratio of the market in our sample period is 0.11, and
a multiplier of, say, 1.2 corresponds to an expected maximum Sharpe ratio of roughly just
0.13. In contrast, the sample produces a maximum Sharpe ratio for the M-4 factors equal
to 0.49, higher than the maximum Sharpe ratios of 0.35 and 0.45 produced by the FF-5
and q-4 factors, respectively. Given that the sample maximum Sharpe ratio for M-4 is in
greatest conflict with a value on the order of 0.13, that model receives the lowest posterior
probability when the prior favors such a low maximum Sharpe ratio.
3.4. Robustness
As discussed earlier, a number of the methodological choices we make when constructing
our factors deviate somewhat from conventions that originate with Fama and French (1993)
and are adopted in later studies such as Fama and French (2015) and Hou, Xue, and Zhang
(2015a). None of these choices are crucial to our model’s relative performance in explaining
anomalies and the other models’ factors. For example, because we believe that the extremes
of our mispricing measure best identify mispricing, we use breakpoints of 20% and 80%
rather than the conventional 30% and 70%. If we recompute Tables 5, 6, and 7 using 30%
and 70%, however, our conclusions remain unchanged. Model M-4 maintains its edge over
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model q-4 and continues to outperform model FF-5 by a substantial margin. The same holds
true if we apply the 20% and 80% breakpoints to just the NYSE universe, instead of to the
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ universe that covers a broader range of the mispricing scores. The
results in Tables 5, 6, and 7 are also not affected much by replacing our SMB, which uses
only stocks in the middle category of the mispricing-score rankings, with the more standard
version that averages returns across all three categories. If we make all of the above changes
simultaneously, again the model comparisons do not change materially. The online appendix
reports all of these results.
In cases where annual data are used to construct factors in model FF-3 of Fama and
French (1993), model FF-5 of Fama and French (2015), and model q-4 of Hou, Xue, and
Zhang (2015a), the authors of those studies require a gap after the end of the fiscal year of
at least 6 months and potentially up to 18 months. When using annual data, we instead
require a gap of at least 4 months, following precedent in the accounting literature (e.g.,
Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004)). Thus, one potential source of performance differ-
ences between our model, M-4, and models FF-5 and q-4 is this difference in timing used to
contruct factors. To explore this possibility, we reconstruct the factors SMB and HML in
model FF-3, SMB, HML, RMW , and CMA in model FF-5, and I/A in model q-4, which
rely on annual data, by imposing the minimum gap of 4 months for information from annual
statements, while using immediate prior-month values of market capitalization. Again our
key results—Tables 5, 6, and 7—are not very sensitive to modifying models FF-5 and q-4 in
that fashion. The online appendix reports these results as well.
We also investigate the stability of our results by splitting our overall 47-year period
into two subperiods: 1967–1990 (24 years) and 1991–2013 (23 years). First, each of the 11
anomalies we use to construct the factors produces positive long-short FF-3 alphas in both
subperiods. In the earlier subperiod, the t-statistics for the long-short alphas range from
1.5 to 5.4 across the 11 anomalies and average 3.4. In the later subperiod, the t-statistics
range from 1.2 to 5.0 and again average 3.4. Second, in each subperiod, the assignment of
anomalies to the two clusters is identical to that of the overall period, using either of the two
methods described earlier. Finally, the superiority of model M-4, as indicated by the results
in Tables 5 and 7, is supported consistently across both subperiods. The online appendix
reports the results of these model comparisons in each subperiod.
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3.5. Factors and Return Variance
Factor models are generally viewed as useful not just for explaining expected returns. An
additional role of factor models is to capture systematic time-series variation in realized
returns. We briefly explore the extent to which mispricing factors can perform this role as
compared to the factors in the alternative models we consider. For various sets of assets, we
compute the R-squared in a regression of each asset’s monthly return on the factors for a
given model. We then average those R-squared values across the assets.
Table 8 reports the average R-squared values obtained for five different sets of assets: 30
industry portfolios plus four sets of 25 portfolios formed with independent two-way 5×5 sorts
of stocks on size and either book-to-market (B/M); the 11-anomaly composite mispricing
measure used by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) (and used below to form the factor in
model M-3); market beta; and return volatility.22 We estimate the regressions for six factor
models: one with just the excess market return (MKT ); one withMKT plus the size-factor
(SMB) from the three-factor model (FF-3) of Fama and French (1993); the latter three-
factor model; the five-factor model (FF-5) of Fama and French (2015); the four-factor model
(q-4) of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a); and model M-4. The factor betas on the assets
are treated as constant over the sample period, so we probably understate the fraction of
variance a given set of factors could explain if the betas were modeled as time-varying. Such
a generalization lies beyond our study. We suggest the simple exercise reported briefly here
nevertheless provides some insight into the relative abilities of the factor models to capture
return variance.
We see in the first row of Table 8 that the market factor on average explains 59.5% of the
variance of monthly industry returns. Adding a size factor increases that average R-squared
only slightly, to 61.1%, and the other factor models further increase the R-squared only
modestly. Model M-4 explains 63.3%, very close to the values of 63.6% for model q-4 and
63.5% for model FF-3. Thus, the model that does best in explaining anomalies—model M-
4—does not appear to do so by sacrificing much if any ability to capture variance of industry
returns.
For the remaining four sets of assets, the most salient difference from the industry results
is that the size factor improves the R-squared substantially over that obtained with just a
single market factor. This outcome is not surprising, as size is one of the sorting variables
22We thank Ken French for providing on his website the returns for the 30 industry portfolios as well as
the size-B/M , size-beta, and size-volatility portfolios.
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used to form these sets of portfolios. Including the size factor adds roughly 8% to 10% to the
R-squared produced by just the market factor. The further increases produced by including
the additional factors in the other factor models are generally more modest, and the relative
ranking of the R-squared values depends on which sorting variable is used in addition to
size. For B/M , models FF-3 and FF-5 enjoy an advantage, which is not surprising given
that B/M is used to form a factor in those models. For a similar reason, model M-4 enjoys
an advantage when the composite mispricing measure is used to sort. Overall the message
delivered here is similar to that for industry portfolios: Mispricing factors generally stack
up well against the alternative models considered when judged by abilities to capture return
variance.
4. A Three-Factor Model
In this section we consider an even more parsimonious factor model, denoted as M-3, that
replaces the two mispricing factors in M-4 with a single mispricing factor, UMO (underpriced
minus overpriced). We construct this single factor in a manner similar to the two factors it
replaces. The main difference is that, instead of separating the 11 anomalies into two clusters,
we simply average each stock’s rankings across all 11 anomalies. We then use this mispricing
measure, along with firm size, to construct a size factor and a mispricing factor, applying a
2× 3 sorting procedure similar to that used by Fama and French (1993) to construct SMB
and HML, but with the same deviations in methodology explained earlier. That is, SMB
is constructed using only stocks in the middle mispricing category, as opposed to averaging
across all three categories. Also, the mispricing-measure breakpoints are the 20th and 80th
percentiles of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ, rather than the 30th and 70th percentiles of the
NYSE. None of the results are sensitive to these deviations, however.
4.1. Comparing abilities to explain anomalies
Table 9 reports measures summarizing model M-3’s ability to accommodate anomalies. Pan-
els A, B, and C of Table 9 correspond to the same anomaly samples reported in the corre-
sponding panels of Table 5, and the summary measures reported in Table 9 for model M-3
are directly comparable to those reported in Table 5 for models FF-3, FF-5, q-4, and M-4.
First observe that the three-factor model M-3 uniformly dominates the five-factor model
FF-5 in all three panels of Table 9 for all four summary measures: average |α|, average
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|t|, and the two GRS statistics for the shorter and longer sample periods. FF-5 in turn
uniformly dominates FF-3, so the contrast between the three-factor models, FF-3 and M-3,
is especially strong. For example, for FF-3, the values of the average |α| in the three panels
in Table 5 are 0.67, 0.44, and 0.53, while, for M-3, the corresponding values in Table 9 are
0.28, 0.24, and 0.30. Comparisons of the average |t| and GRS statistics reveal similarly sharp
differences between FF-3 and M-3. In addition to the results reported in Table 9, we find
that M-3 produces a smaller |α| than does FF-3 for 11 of the 12 anomalies in Panel A, 55
of the 73 anomalies in Panel B, and 58 of the 73 anomalies in Panel C. It appears that
essentially replacing the book-to-market factor in FF-3 with a composite mispricing factor
delivers a three-factor model with substantially greater ability to accommodate a wide range
of anomalies.
The comparison of q-4 and M-3 in terms of their abilities to explain amomalies does not
reveal a clear winner. On one hand, M-3 does better by producing p-values for five out of
six of the GRS tests in Table 9 that are higher than the corresponding p-values produced
by q-4 in Table 5. In addition, M-3 produces lower average |α| and lower average |t| for the
12 anomalies in Panel A of those tables. On the other hand, q-4 produces lower average |α|
and lower average |t| for the larger set of 73 anomalies, reported in Panels B and C.
Model M-4 generally appears to explain anomalies better than model M-3. For all mea-
sures except the GRS tests in Panel C, where M-3 holds a slight edge, M-4 performs better
than M-3. Overall, among all of the models we consider, M-4 generally exhibits the greatest
ability to explain anomalies.
4.2. Comparing abilities to explain other models’ factors
Table 10 repeats the same analysis reported earlier in Table 7, except that model M-3, with
its single factor, UMO, replaces model M-4 and its two factors, MGMT and PERF . The
most striking results in Table 10 are the large UMO alphas obtained under both FF-5 and
q-4. Observe in Panel A that the UMO alpha under FF-5 is 77 basis points per month with
a t-statistic of 6.88, and the UMO alpha under q-4 is 60 basis points with a t-statistic of
5.08. Given these t-statistics, the p-values for the corresponding GRS test statistics in Panel
B, less than 5× 10−10, are very small.23 Overall, models FF-5 and q-4 fail rather strongly
to price the single mispricing factor in model M-3.
23The F -statistics in Panel B for these single-asset versions of the GRS test do not exactly equal the
square of the t-statistics in Panel A, because the latter are computed using the heteroskedasticity correction
of White (1980), whereas the GRS F -test assumes homoskedastic disturbances.
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Model M-3 does a comparatively better job of handling the factors in FF-5 and q-4. In
Panel A of Table 10, the alpha of HML under M-3 is 34 basis points with a t-statistic of 2.53,
while the other two FF-5 factors, RMW and CMA, have insignificant alphas of 13 basis
points or less. In Panel B, the GRS joint test of zero alphas for HML, RMW , and CMA
yields a p-value of 0.06, insignificant by usual standards. Model M-3 has somewhat more
trouble pricing the factors in q-4 than those in FF-5, as is the case for model M-4, noted
earlier. Although the alpha for ROE under M-3 is just 17 basis points with a t-statistic of
1.60, the alpha for I/A is 25 basis points with a t-statistic of 2.87, and the GRS joint test of
both alphas being zero gives a p-value of just 4.1×10−4. Observe, however, that none of the
alphas for another model’s factors are even half as large as that model’s alpha for UMO.
Table 11 reports a comparison of the abilities of models M-3 and M-4 to explain each
other’s factors. We see that neither model does well in this regard. In Panel A, the alpha
of UMO under model M-4 is 21 basis points with a t-statistic of 4.76, while the alphas of
MGMT and PERF under model M-3 are 33 and -43 basis points, with t-statistics of 3.18
and -3.63. In Panel B, the p-values of both GRS tests are small, though the one for model
M-3 is somewhat larger. In sum, even though the non-nested models M-3 and M-4 both
contain mispricing factors, neither model subsumes the other.
The Bayesian model comparisons displayed earlier in Figure 1 are repeated in Figure 2,
with model M-3 replacing model M-4 in the comparisons to models FF-5 and q-4. When
either of the latter two models are compared to M-3, the posterior probability for model M-3
is nearly one for all priors except those that admit extremely small potential improvements
over the market’s Sharpe ratio. Moreover, in this Bayesian model comparison, model M-3
dominates model M-4 with a plot (not displayed) nearly identical to that displayed in both
panels of Figure 2. Playing a key role in the superior performance of model M-3 in these
comparisons is that the three factors of M-3 combine to give a maximum Sharpe ratio of
0.50, higher than the earlier-reported values of 0.35, 0.45, and 0.49 for models FF-5, q-4,
and M-4, respectively. The slightly higher Sharpe ratio achieved by M-3 as compared to
M-4 is consistent with the noise-diversification rationale for averaging anomaly rankings,
discussed earlier. Averaging across all 11 anomalies (as in M-3) eliminates more noise than
averaging separately within the clusters used to form the two mispricing factors in M-4. We
see that even though the weights on the latter two factors are optimized within the sample
when computing the maximum Sharpe ratio for M-4, the stronger diversification benefit of
averaging across all 11 anomalies allows M-3 to achieve a slightly higher Sharpe ratio.
When judged simply by abilities to price other models’ factors, model M-3 dominates in
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the head-to-head comparisons with each of the other models. In contrast, model M-4 does
best in accommodating a wide range of anomalies. As with our findings for model M-4,
our conclusions regarding model M-3 are generally supported within each half of the overall
period. The online appendix reports the analyses in Tables 9, 10, and 11 for each subperiod.
5. Arbitrage Risk and the Factor Models
Idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) represents risk for arbitrageurs seeking to exploit mispricing
(e.g., Pontiff (2006)). IVOLs relation to average return also presents an anomaly, in that
stocks with high (low) IVOL have negative (positive) alphas with respect to the CAPM of
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) as well as the three-factor model of Fama and French
(1993). (See, for example, Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006).) Some of the models with
additional factors appear to explain this IVOL anomaly, but as we show below, such results
prove illusory when recognizing that IVOL represents arbitrage risk.
As explained by Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015), since higher IVOL implies greater
arbitrage risk, mispricing should get corrected less among stocks with high IVOL. Among
overpriced stocks, the relation between IVOL and alpha should therefore be negative, as
arbitrage eliminates less overpricing in high-IVOL stocks. Among underpriced stocks, the
relation between IVOL and alpha should be positive, as less underpricing is eliminated
in high-IVOL stocks. With arbitrage asymmetry, however, the negative relation among
overpriced stocks should be stronger, resulting in the overall negative relation between alpha
and IVOL—the IVOL anomaly. Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) report results consistent
with these predictions. Panel A of Table 12 essentially repeats their analysis with just a
slightly longer sample period. As in that study, stocks are sorted independently with respect
to IVOL and a mispricing measure that averages the rankings for the 11 anomalies.24 We
obtain similar results. The last row of Panel A displays the familiar negative relation between
IVOL and FF-3 alpha, and the negative IVOL effect among overpriced stocks is stronger
than the positive relation among underpriced stocks.
Panel B of Table 12 repeats the analysis, using the same mispricing and IVOL rankings
as in Panel A, but with alphas computed with respect to FF-5. The negative IVOL-alpha
relation among the overpriced stocks is stronger than the positive relation among the under-
24We compute individual stock IVOL, following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006), as the standard
deviation of the most recent month’s daily benchmark-adjusted returns. The latter returns are computed as
the residuals in a regression of each stock’s daily return on the three factors in model FF-3.
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priced stocks. Thus the overall IVOL-alpha relation in the bottom row of the panel is again
negative, though it is substantially weaker than in Panel A. In the latter case the difference
between the highest and lowest IVOL portfolio alphas is −81 bps per month (t-statistic:
−6.04), as compared to the corresponding value in Panel B of −33 bps (t-statistic: −2.69).
Panels C and D of Table 12 repeat the same analysis for models q-4 and M-4. Both
of these models appear to explain the IVOL anomaly, given the results in the last row of
each panel. For model q-4, the difference between the highest and lowest IVOL portfolio
alphas is −23 bps per month, about one-third smaller than that for FF-5, and the t-statistic
of −1.58 is insignificant at conventional levels. For model M-4, reported in Panel D, the
highest-versus-lowest IVOL difference is −12 bps, and the t-statistic is just −0.79. We can
see, however, that these results in the last row of each panel obscure important IVOL effects.
For both models, the relation between IVOL and alpha is strongly negative (positive) among
the overpriced (underpriced) stocks. The insignificance of the overall IVOL-alpha relation
simply reflects a lower degree of asymmetry in the strength of the IVOL effects in the
overpriced and underpriced segments.
This lower asymmetry in the IVOL effects for models q-4 and M-4 is consistent with
the earlier reported results indicating that these models have the greatest overall abilities to
capture mispricing reflected in anomalies. A model with a greater ability to capture mispric-
ing is likely to be better at capturing mispricing where it tends to be most severe—among
high-IVOL overpriced stocks. Observe in Table 12 that the monthly alpha for the high-IVOL
overpriced portfolio increases monotonically from −1.87% to −0.96% when moving across
the models in Panels A through D. This 91 basis point difference, much larger than any of
the other cross-model differences in Table 12, substantially weakens the negative IVOL effect
in overpriced stocks when moving from model FF-3 to model M-4. With this weaker (but
still significant) negative IVOL effect, there is less asymmetry in the opposing IVOL effects
for underpriced and overpriced stocks.
6. Conclusions
Popular factors are generally constructed by ranking stocks on characteristics that initially
gained the finance profession’s attention by producing return anomalies. We also construct
factors based on documented anomalies, but with a key difference. Rather than have each
factor correspond to a single anomaly, as is typical, we construct factors by combining
stocks’ rankings with respect to 11 prominent anomalies. Specifically, we form two factors
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by averaging rankings within two clusters of anomalies whose long-short profits exhibit the
greatest co-movement. We denote the resulting long-short return spreads as “mispricing”
factors, motivated by evidence that anomalies in part reflect mispricing and possess common
sentiment effects. Both of the mispricing factors exhibit a significant relation to lagged
investor sentiment.
We combine the two mispricing factors with market and size factors to produce a four-
factor model. We find that this four-factor model’s ability to accommodate a wide range
of anomalies exceeds that of both the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a)
and the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015). Our four-factor model also dominates
those models when judging models by their abilities to price each other’s factors, using both
frequentist and Bayesian methods. If our two new factors are replaced by a single factor that
simply averages rankings across our entire set of anomalies, rather than within two clusters,
the resulting three-factor model also performs well. It explains anomalies better than models
with more factors, especially the Fama-French five-factor model, and it actually performs
best of all when comparing models’ abilities to price each other’s factors.
The typical approach to constructing a size factor using a two-way sort is to average
across the categories of the other sorting variable, which in our case is a mispricing measure.
We instead construct the size factor using stocks in neither extreme of a mispricing measure,
in order to be less susceptible to asymmetric degrees of overpricing versus underpricing. The
resulting size factor reveals a substantially larger small-firm premium than usual estimates.
Mispricing factors can reflect common elements of mispricing, such as market-wide senti-
ment effects, but a parsimonious factor model is challenged to fully explain expected returns
when mispricing is present. For example, factor models have difficulty accommodating the
role idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) plays as risk that deters price-correcting arbitrage. Al-
though the well known IVOL anomaly of Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) appears
to be explained by some of the factor models we consider, such success is misleading. Al-
phas with respect to these factor models exhibit opposite and offsetting relations to IVOL,
depending on whether the mispricing that the models fail to capture—the alphas—reflect
relative underpricing or overpricing. In this sense, while parsimonious factor models are
appealing and useful, there are limits to their abilities to explain expected returns. Nev-
ertheless, among such models, those with mispricing factors appear to have greater ability
than prominent alternatives.
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Table 1
Factor Summary Statistics
The table reports summary statistics for the monthly observations of the factors in the M-4 model. The sample
period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months).
Correlations
Factor Mean(%) Std. Dev.(%) MGMT PERF SMB MKT
MGMT 0.62 2.93 1 0.00 -0.30 -0.55
PERF 0.70 3.83 0.00 1 -0.06 -0.25
SMB 0.46 2.90 -0.30 -0.06 1 0.26
MKT 0.51 4.60 -0.55 -0.25 0.26 1
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Table 2
Factor Loadings and Alphas of Anomaly Strategies
Under the Mispricing-Factor Model
The table reports the model’s factor loadings and monthly alphas (in percent) for 12 anomalies. For each
anomaly, the regression estimated is
Rt = α+ βMKTMKTt + βSMBSMBt + βMGMTMGMTt + βPERFPERFt + t,
where Rt is the return in month t on the anomaly’s long-leg, short-leg, or long-short spread, MKTt is the
excess market return, SMBt is the model’s size factor, and MGMTt and PERFt are the mispricing factors.
The long leg of an anomaly is the value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest decile of the anomaly measure,
and the short leg contains the stocks in the highest decile, where a high value of the measure is associated
with lower return. The breakpoints are based on NYSE deciles, but all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks with
share prices of at least $5 are included. Data for the distress anomaly begin in October 1974, and data for the
return-on-assets anomaly begin in November 1971. The other ten anomalies begin at the start of the sample
period, which is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months). All t-statistics are based on the
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of White (1980).
Anomaly α βMKT βSMB βMGMT βPERF tα tMKT tSMB tMGMT tPERF
Panel A: Long-Short Spreads
First Cluster (used to construct mispricing factor MGMT )
Net stock issues 0.06 0.02 -0.14 0.63 0.22 0.70 0.86 -3.64 17.21 8.85
Composite equity issues 0.07 -0.07 -0.06 0.85 0.05 0.70 -2.23 -1.22 18.12 1.72
Accruals 0.31 0.00 -0.28 0.38 0.02 2.08 0.12 -5.23 6.09 0.48
Net operating assets 0.22 0.11 -0.05 0.46 -0.01 1.70 2.72 -0.73 8.54 -0.28
Asset growth -0.22 0.04 0.33 0.94 -0.02 -1.96 1.31 7.42 15.99 -0.54
Investment-to-assets 0.06 0.03 0.25 0.64 -0.09 0.54 1.12 5.40 11.83 -2.61
Average 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.65 0.03 0.63 0.65 0.33 12.96 1.27
Second Cluster (used to construct mispricing factor PERF )
Distress -0.16 -0.29 -0.35 0.31 1.17 -1.03 -7.13 -3.89 3.96 24.10
O-score 0.35 -0.15 -0.73 -0.09 0.23 2.42 -3.86 -14.43 -1.39 5.02
Momentum 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.25 1.21 0.47 1.78 1.44 1.71 12.15
Gross profitability 0.11 -0.14 -0.05 -0.32 0.66 0.92 -4.45 -1.29 -6.08 18.04
Return on assets 0.27 -0.02 -0.38 0.06 0.66 1.90 -0.41 -5.49 0.95 13.21
Average 0.14 -0.10 -0.27 0.04 0.79 0.94 -2.81 -4.73 -0.17 14.50
Book-to-market -0.17 0.09 0.54 0.89 -0.35 -1.10 2.50 9.21 12.70 -7.52
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Table 2 (Continued)
Factor Loadings and Alphas of Anomaly Strategies
Under the Mispricing-Factor Model
Anomaly α βMKT βSMB βMGMT βPERF tα tMKT tSMB tMGMT tPERF
Panel B: Long Legs
First Cluster (used to construct mispricing factor MGMT )
Net stock issues -0.06 1.04 -0.03 0.31 0.06 -1.39 83.49 -1.22 14.29 4.18
Composite equity issues -0.01 0.98 0.05 0.48 -0.06 -0.18 33.81 0.98 11.13 -2.31
Accruals 0.19 1.05 0.02 -0.22 0.08 1.74 34.37 0.44 -4.64 2.37
Net operating assets 0.13 1.08 0.03 0.09 -0.08 1.44 44.02 0.86 2.49 -2.92
Asset growth -0.15 1.11 0.35 0.34 -0.01 -1.58 43.33 11.25 6.99 -0.18
Investment-to-assets -0.01 1.07 0.35 0.17 0.02 -0.13 50.21 10.80 5.52 0.83
Average 0.02 1.06 0.13 0.20 0.00 -0.02 48.21 3.85 5.96 0.33
Second Cluster (used to construct mispricing factor PERF )
Distress -0.22 0.98 0.11 0.04 0.39 -2.32 37.65 1.79 0.78 12.27
O-score 0.18 0.94 -0.12 -0.32 0.14 2.04 43.07 -3.38 -6.62 4.26
Momentum 0.10 1.15 0.38 -0.18 0.46 0.77 31.69 6.59 -2.40 9.48
Gross profitability 0.05 0.97 -0.01 -0.01 0.24 0.52 36.95 -0.28 -0.29 7.14
Return on assets 0.14 1.01 -0.06 -0.25 0.27 1.92 53.19 -2.03 -7.25 10.94
Average 0.05 1.01 0.06 -0.14 0.30 0.59 40.51 0.54 -3.16 8.82
Book-to-market -0.10 1.09 0.38 0.54 -0.17 -0.91 38.00 8.42 10.38 -4.95
Panel C: Short Legs
First Cluster (used to construct mispricing factor MGMT )
Net stock issues -0.13 1.02 0.11 -0.32 -0.16 -1.52 46.95 3.62 -8.82 -6.62
Composite equity issues -0.09 1.05 0.11 -0.37 -0.11 -1.26 58.06 3.80 -11.80 -5.11
Accruals -0.11 1.04 0.30 -0.61 0.06 -1.35 47.35 8.75 -16.11 2.43
Net operating assets -0.09 0.97 0.08 -0.37 -0.07 -1.20 43.72 2.34 -11.45 -2.80
Asset growth 0.07 1.07 0.02 -0.60 0.01 1.05 55.02 0.60 -20.20 0.77
Investment-to-assets -0.07 1.04 0.10 -0.47 0.11 -0.75 41.33 2.90 -9.14 3.21
Average -0.07 1.03 0.12 -0.46 -0.03 -0.84 48.74 3.67 -12.92 -1.35
Second Cluster (used to construct mispricing factor PERF )
Distress -0.06 1.28 0.46 -0.27 -0.78 -0.52 39.36 8.75 -4.67 -23.10
O-score -0.17 1.09 0.62 -0.23 -0.10 -1.80 40.74 13.34 -5.14 -3.05
Momentum -0.02 1.03 0.21 -0.43 -0.75 -0.14 24.38 3.04 -4.91 -12.39
Gross profitability -0.06 1.10 0.04 0.31 -0.42 -0.56 38.35 1.25 5.94 -13.00
Return on assets -0.13 1.03 0.32 -0.32 -0.39 -0.99 28.53 4.69 -5.06 -8.69
Average -0.09 1.11 0.33 -0.19 -0.49 -0.80 34.27 6.21 -2.77 -12.05
Book-to-market 0.07 1.00 -0.16 -0.35 0.18 0.92 51.01 -6.31 -11.45 7.87
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Table 3
Investor Sentiment and the Factors
The table reports estimates of b in the regression
Rt = a+ bSt−1 + ut,
where Rt is the excess return in month t on either the long leg, the short leg, or the long-short difference
for each of the factors (MKT , SMB, MGMT and PERF ), and St−1 is the previous month’s level of the
investor-sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006). All t-statistics are based on the heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors of White (1980). The sample period is from January 1967 through December 2010
(528 months).
Long Leg Short Leg Long−Short
Factor bˆ t-stat. bˆ t-stat. bˆ t-stat.
MKT - - - - -0.32 -1.37
SMB -0.49 -1.72 -0.27 -1.17 -0.22 -1.60
MGMT -0.22 -0.98 -0.66 -2.06 0.44 2.81
PERF -0.31 -1.29 -0.67 -2.05 0.36 2.02
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Table 4
Anomaly Alphas Under Different Factor Models
For long-short returns corresponding to 12 anomalies, the table reports information about alphas computed under
four different factor models: the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), denoted FF-3; the five-factor
model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted
q-4; and the four-factor mispricing-factor model introduced in this study, denoted M-4. Also reported are the
average unadjusted return spreads (the alphas in a model with no factors). In constructing the long-short spreads,
the long leg is the value-weighted portfolio of stocks in the lowest decile of the anomaly measure, and the short leg
contains the stocks in the highest decile, where a high value of the measure is associated with lower return. The
breakpoints are based on NYSE deciles, but all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks with share prices of at least $5
are included. Panel A reports the monthly alphas (in percent); Panel B reports their heteroskedasticity-consistent
t-statistics based on White (1980). The sample period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months).
Anomaly Unadjusted FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: Alphas
Net stock issues 0.56 0.66 0.32 0.37 0.06
Composite equity issues 0.58 0.54 0.34 0.51 0.07
Accruals 0.43 0.51 0.56 0.65 0.31
Net operating assets 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.43 0.22
Asset growth 0.52 0.32 0.06 0.08 -0.22
Investment-to-assets 0.53 0.42 0.35 0.32 0.06
Distress 0.44 1.21 0.62 0.20 -0.16
O-score 0.05 0.49 0.45 0.47 0.35
Momentum 1.26 1.59 1.35 0.48 0.12
Gross profitability 0.28 0.69 0.35 0.39 0.11
Return on assets 0.58 0.91 0.43 0.10 0.27
Book-to-market 0.43 -0.20 -0.14 -0.03 -0.17
Panel B: t-statistics
Net stock issues 4.77 6.60 3.42 3.54 0.71
Composite equity issues 3.88 4.93 2.94 4.10 0.70
Accruals 2.95 3.61 3.94 4.30 2.08
Net operating assets 4.32 4.10 3.63 3.03 1.70
Asset growth 3.69 2.83 0.58 0.72 -1.96
Investment-to-assets 4.28 3.48 3.04 2.72 0.54
Distress 1.54 5.03 2.29 0.78 -1.03
O-score 0.30 4.28 3.92 3.89 2.42
Momentum 4.58 5.70 4.12 1.40 0.47
Gross profitability 1.79 5.22 2.78 2.50 0.92
Return on assets 3.18 5.52 3.13 0.85 1.90
Book-to-market 2.39 -1.99 -1.33 -0.19 -1.10
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Table 5
Summary Measures of Models’ Abilities to Explain Anomalies
The table reports measures that summarize the degree to which anomalies produce alpha under four different
factor models: the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), denoted FF-3; the five-factor model of Fama
and French (2015), denoted FF-5; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4; and the
four-factor mispricing-factor model introduced in this study, denoted M-4. Also reported are measures based on
the average unadjusted return spreads (the alphas in a model with no factors). For each model, the table reports
the average absolute alpha, average absolute t-statistic, the F -statistic and associated p-value for the “GRS” test
of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989), and the number of anomalies for which the model produces the smallest
absolute alpha among the models being compared in the table. In Panel A, two versions of the GRS test are
reported. Data for the distress anomaly begin in October 1974, and data for the return-on-assets anomaly begin
in November 1971. The other ten anomalies begin at the start of the sample period, which is from January 1967
through December 2013 (564 months). GRS10 tests whether the ten alphas for the full-sample anomalies equal
zero, while GRS12 uses all 12 anomalies and begins the sample in October 1974. Panels B and C also report two
versions of the GRS test: GRS51 uses 51 anomalies whose data are available by January 1967, while GRS72 uses
those anomalies plus 21 others whose data are available by February 1986.
Measure Unadjusted FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: 12 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.52 0.67 0.45 0.34 0.18
Average |t| 3.14 4.44 2.93 2.34 1.29
GRS10 6.89 10.10 6.71 5.99 1.84
p10 3.4×10
−10 1.1×10−15 6.9×10−10 1.2×10−8 0.05
GRS12 6.16 7.71 4.17 3.95 1.88
p12 4.5×10
−10 4.2×10−13 3.1×10−6 8.3×10−6 0.03
Number of min|α| - 0 1 2 9
Panel B: 73 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.39 0.44 0.30 0.20 0.18
Average |t| 2.14 2.74 1.77 1.15 0.99
GRS51 2.74 2.60 1.91 1.68 1.28
p51 9.3×10
−9 6.5×10−8 2.9×10−4 3.2×10−3 0.10
GRS72 2.23 2.10 1.79 1.78 1.54
p72 2.2×10
−6 1.3×10−5 5.3×10−4 5.8×10−4 8.1×10−3
Number of min|α| - 7 10 19 37
Panel C: 73 Anomalies, equally weighted, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.50 0.53 0.35 0.23 0.22
Average |t| 3.02 3.72 2.41 1.44 1.38
GRS51 5.85 6.31 5.15 4.19 4.17
p51 2.7×10
−27 6.2×10−30 4.3×10−23 2.3×10−17 3.1×10−17
GRS72 2.95 3.25 2.64 2.41 2.68
p72 1.4×10
−10 3.0×10−12 1.1×10−8 2.3×10−7 6.2×10−9
Number of min|α| - 7 11 23 32
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Table 6
Summary Measures of Models’ Abilities to Explain Anomalies Less
Correlated with Factors in Models q-4 and M-4
The table reports measures that summarize the degree to which anomalies produce alpha under four different
factor models: the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), denoted FF-3; the five-factor model of Fama
and French (2015), denoted FF-5; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4; and the
four-factor mispricing-factor model introduced in this study, denoted M-4. Also reported are measures based on
the average unadjusted return spreads (the alphas in a model with no factors). For each model, the table reports
the average absolute alpha, average absolute t-statistic, the F -statistic and associated p-value for the “GRS” test
of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989), and the number of anomalies for which the model produces the smallest
absolute alpha among the models being compared in the table. Panels A and B correspond to Panels B and C of
Table 5, except the set of anomalies is reduced: For each of four factors—those in models q-4 and M-4 other than
the market and size factors—the five anomalies (of the 73) whose long-short returns are most highly correlated
with the factor are eliminated. This procedure leaves 57 anomalies in Panel A and 54 in Panel B. The sample
period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months). Two versions of the GRS test are reported:
GRS41 in Panel A (or GRS40 in Panel B), uses the 41 (or 40) anomalies whose data are available by January
1967, while GRS56 in Panel A (or GRS53 in Panel B) uses the remaining anomalies whose data are available by
February 1986.
Measure Unadjusted FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: 57 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.37 0.39 0.27 0.19 0.17
Average |t| 2.14 2.60 1.71 1.15 0.97
GRS41 3.01 2.81 1.95 1.63 1.26
p41 6.7×10
−9 6.1×10−8 5.8×10−4 9.3×10−3 0.13
GRS56 2.29 2.16 1.73 1.64 1.53
p56 5.5×10
−6 2.5×10−5 2.3×10−3 5.2×10−3 0.01
Number of min|α| - 4 7 15 31
Number of min|α|, q-4 vs. M-4 - - - 21 36
Panel B: 54 Anomalies, equally weighted, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.45 0.46 0.32 0.25 0.23
Average |t| 2.94 3.53 2.41 1.61 1.47
GRS40 6.38 7.03 5.78 4.69 4.55
p40 7.3×10
−26 5.0×10−29 8.3×10−23 2.9×10−17 1.6×10−16
GRS53 3.36 4.07 3.12 2.82 3.03
p53 3.6×10
−11 1.0×10−14 6.7×10−10 2.0E×10−8 1.8×10−9
Number of min|α| - 6 9 16 23
Number of min|α|, q-4 vs. M-4 - - - 21 33
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Table 7
Abilities of Models FF-5, q-4, and M-4 to Explain Each Other’s Factors
Panel A reports a factor’s estimated monthly alpha (in percent) with respect to each of the other models (with
White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses). Panel B computes the Gibbons-Ross-
Shanken (1989) F -test of whether a given model produces zero alphas for the factors of an alternative model
(with p-values in parentheses). The factors whose alphas are tested are those other than a model’s market and
size factors. The models considered are the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5, which
includes the factors HML, RMW , and CMA; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted
q-4, which includes the factors I/A and ROE; and the four-factor mispricing-factor model, denoted M-4, which
includes the factors MGMT and PERF . The sample period is from January 1967 through December 2013
(564 months).
Alpha computed with respect to model
Factors FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: Alpha (t-statistic)
Factors in FF-5
HML - 0.04 -0.03
(0.43) (-0.28)
RMW - 0.04 0.11
(0.55) (1.35)
CMA - 0.02 -0.03
(0.47) (-0.56)
Factors in q-4
I/A 0.12 - 0.09
(3.48) (1.57)
ROE 0.45 - 0.36
(5.53) (4.00)
Factors in M-4
MGMT 0.33 0.36 -
(4.93) (4.54)
PERF 0.64 0.35 -
(4.17) (2.24)
Panel B: GRS F -statistic (p-value)
HML, RMW , CMA - 0.23 0.65
(0.87) (0.58)
I/A, ROE 19.06 - 9.12
(9.8×10−9) (1.3×10−4)
MGMT , PERF 25.35 15.66 -
(2.9×10−11) (2.4×10−7)
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Table 8
Percent of Return Variance Explained by Factor Models
The table reports the average R-squared in regressions of monthly asset returns on factors. Regressions are estimated
for seven factor models: one with just the excess market return (MKT ); one with MKT plus a size-factor (SMB);
the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), denoted FF-3; the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015),
denoted FF-5; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4; and the four-factor mispricing-
factor model introduced in this study, denoted M-4. The sets of assets consist of 30 industry portfolios plus four
sets of 25 portfolios formed with independent two-way 5 × 5 sorts on size and either book-to-market (B/M), the
11-anomaly composite mispricing measure, market beta, or return volatility. The sample period is from January
1967 through December 2013 (564 months).
Number of Factor Model
Assets Description MKT MKT & SMB FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
30 Industry Portfolios 59.5 61.1 63.5 66.1 63.6 63.3
25 Size-B/M Portfolios 74.9 85.3 91.6 92.1 88.4 88.1
25 Size-Mispricing Portfolios 81.2 89.8 90.8 91.9 91.2 92.3
25 Size-Beta Portfolios 75.6 86.0 88.8 89.8 88.1 87.7
25 Size-Volatility Portfolios 75.3 83.2 87.1 89.4 86.4 86.6
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Table 9
Summary Measures of the Abilities of a Model with a Single Mispricing Factor
to Explain Anomalies
The table reports summary statistics for alphas computed under a model that combines a market and size factor
with a single mispricing factor, denoted model M-3. The mispricing factor is constructed using a composite
mispricing measure that averages stocks’ rankings across 11 anomalies. The table reports the model’s average
absolute monthly (percent) alpha, average absolute t-statistic, and the F -statistic and associated p-value for
the “GRS” test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989). In Panel A, two versions of the GRS test are reported.
Data for the distress anomaly begin in October 1974, and data for the return-on-assets anomaly begin in
November 1971. The other ten anomalies begin at the start of the sample period, which is from January
1967 through December 2013 (564 months). GRS10 tests whether the ten alphas for the full-sample anomalies
equal zero, while GRS12 uses all 12 anomalies and begins the sample in October 1974. Panels B and C also
report two versions of the GRS test: GRS51 uses 51 anomalies whose data are available by January 1967,
while GRS72 use those anomalies plus 21 others whose data are available by February 1986.
Panel A: 12 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.28
Average |t| 1.78
GRS10 2.50
p10 6.1×10
−3
GRS12 3.03
p12 4.2×10
−4
Panel B: 73 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.24
Average |t| 1.17
GRS51 1.46
p51 0.02
GRS72 1.67
p72 1.9×10
−3
Panel C: 73 Anomalies, equally weighted,
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.30
Average |t| 1.61
GRS51 4.09
p51 9.7×10
−17
GRS72 2.48
p72 8.9×10
−8
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Table 10
Abilities of Models FF-5, q-4, and M-3 to Explain Each Other’s Factors
Panel A reports a factor’s estimated monthly alpha (in percent) with respect to each of the other models (with
White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses). Panel B computes the Gibbons-Ross-
Shanken (1989) F -test of whether a given model produces zero alphas for the factors of an alternative model
(with p-values in parentheses). The factors whose alphas are tested are those other than a model’s market
and size factors. The models considered are the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5,
which includes the factors HML, RMW , and CMA; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a),
denoted q-4, which includes the factors I/A and ROE; and the three-factor mispricing factor model, denoted
M-3, which includes the factor UMO. The sample period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564
months).
Alpha computed with respect to model
Factors FF-5 q-4 M-3
Panel A: Alpha (t-statistic)
Factors in FF-5
HML - 0.04 0.34
(0.43) (2.53)
RMW - 0.04 0.08
(0.55) (0.90)
CMA - 0.02 0.13
(0.47) (1.56)
Factors in q-4
I/A 0.12 - 0.25
(3.48) (2.87)
ROE 0.45 - 0.17
(5.53) (1.60)
Factor in M-3
UMO 0.77 0.60 -
(6.88) (5.08)
Panel B: GRS F -statistic (p-value)
HML, RMW , CMA - 0.23 2.44
(0.87) (0.06)
I/A, ROE 19.06 - 7.89
(9.8×10−9) (4.1×10−4)
UMO 67.40 38.98 -
(1.5×10−15) (4.9×10−10)
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Table 11
Abilities of Models M-3 and M-4 to Explain Each Other’s Factors
Panel A reports a factor’s estimated monthly alpha (in percent) with respect to each of the other models
(with White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses). Panel B computes the Gibbons-
Ross-Shanken (1989) F -test of whether a given model produces zero alphas for the factors of an alternative
model (with p-values in parentheses). The factors whose alphas are tested are those other than a model’s
market and size factors. The models considered are the three-factor mispricing factor model, denoted M-3,
which includes the factor UMO, and the four-factor mispricing-factor model, denoted M-4, which includes the
factors MGMT and PERF . The sample period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months).
Alpha computed with respect to model
Factors M-3 M-4
Panel A: Alpha (t-statistic)
Factor in M-3
UMO - 0.21
(4.76)
Factors in M-4
MGMT 0.33 -
(3.18)
PERF -0.43 -
(-3.63)
Panel B: GRS F -statistic (p-value)
UMO - 21.97
(3.5×10−6)
MGMT , PERF 6.67 -
(1.4×10−3)
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Table 12
Idiosyncratic Volatility Effects in Underpriced versus Overpriced Stocks
This table reports, for each of four models, the monthly percentage alphas on value-weighted portfolios formed by
an independent 5× 5 sort on the composite mispricing measure—the average ranking across 11 anomalies—and
IVOL—the previous month’s daily volatility of residuals from the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993).
The most overpriced stocks are those in the top 20% of the mispricing measure, while the most underpriced are
those in the bottom 20%. Panel A reports alphas with respect to the three-factor model of Fama and French
(1993), model FF-3; Panel B reports alphas for the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), model FF-5;
Panel C reports alphas for the four-factor model of Hou, Xing, and Zhang (2015a), model q-4; Panel D reports
alphas for the four-factor mispricing-factor model, model M-4. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics based on
White (1980) are shown in parentheses. The sample period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564
months).
Highest Next Next Next Lowest Highest
IVOL 20% 20% 20% IVOL −Lowest
Panel A: FF-3 Alpha
Most Overpriced -1.87 -0.92 -0.77 -0.51 -0.23 -1.64
(-12.04) (-6.89) (-5.42) (-4.13) (-1.85) (-8.46)
Most Underpriced 0.45 0.61 0.50 0.35 0.15 0.30
(2.86) (4.56) (4.95) (4.3) (2.18) (1.70)
All Stocks -0.72 -0.12 -0.02 0.02 0.10 -0.81
(-6.52) (-1.61) (-0.38) (0.46) (2.31) (-6.04)
Panel B: FF-5 Alpha
Most Overpriced -1.40 -0.65 -0.55 -0.47 -0.17 -1.23
(-8.71) (-4.63) (-3.85) (-3.54) (-1.27) (-6.15)
Most Underpriced 0.57 0.61 0.39 0.17 -0.07 0.64
(3.44) (4.03) (3.75) (1.99) (-1.02) (3.61)
All Stocks -0.36 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.33
(-3.55) (0.19) (-0.11) (-1.44) (-0.70) (-2.69)
Panel C: q-4 Alpha
Most Overpriced -1.25 -0.44 -0.55 -0.45 -0.14 -1.11
(-7.57) (-3.11) (-3.38) (-2.8) (-0.85) (-4.88)
Most Underpriced 0.47 0.59 0.32 0.07 -0.14 0.61
(2.43) (3.56) (2.93) (0.84) (-1.65) (2.96)
All Stocks -0.28 0.09 0.01 -0.13 -0.05 -0.23
(-2.40) (1.13) (0.13) (-2.00) (-1.05) (-1.58)
Panel D: M-4 Alpha
Most Overpriced -0.96 -0.20 -0.16 -0.11 0.08 -1.04
(-6.33) (-1.61) (-1.05) (-0.88) (0.57) (-4.40)
Most Underpriced 0.36 0.28 0.23 0.00 -0.26 0.62
(2.08) (1.93) (2.16) (-0.05) (-3.66) (3.17)
All Stocks -0.21 0.13 0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.12
(-1.75) (1.60) (1.22) (-0.91) (-1.80) (-0.79)
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Panel A. M-4 versus FF-5
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Panel B. M-4 versus q-4
M-4
q-4
Figure 1. Model probabilities comparing model M-4 to models FF-5 and q-4. The
figure displays Bayesian posterior model probabilities for two-way model comparisons. The value
on the horizontal axis is the square root of the prior expected maximum Sharpe ratio achievable
by combining the model’s factors, divided by the observed Sharpe ratio of the market. Prior model
probabilities are equal. Panel A compares model M-4 to the five-factor model of Fama and French
(2015), model FF-5. Panel B compares M-4 to the four-factor model of Hou, Xing, and Zhang
(2015a), model q-4. The sample period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months)
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Panel A. M-3 versus FF-5
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Panel B. M-3 versus q-4
M-3
q-4
Figure 2. Model probabilities comparing model M-3 to models FF-5 and q-4. The
figure displays Bayesian posterior model probabilities for two-way model comparisons. The value
on the horizontal axis is the square root of the prior expected maximum Sharpe ratio achievable
by combining the model’s factors, divided by the observed Sharpe ratio of the market. Prior model
probabilities are equal. Panel A compares model M-3 to the five-factor model of Fama and French
(2015), model FF-5. Panel B compares M-3 to the four-factor model of Hou, Xing, and Zhang
(2015a), model q-4. The sample period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months)
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APPENDIX
The 11 Anomalies Used to Construct the Mispricing Factors
Below we detail the construction of the anomaly measures used to construct mispricing scores
and form anomaly portfolios and mispricing factors. The anomaly measures are computed at the
end of each month. We exclude stocks with share prices less than $5, primarily to avoid micro-
structure effects, and we use ordinary common shares (CRSP codes 10 and 11). The anomaly
portfolios are constructed using NYSE deciles as breakpoints. When constructing the mispricing
factors, we require that a stock have non-missing values at the end of month t − 1 for at least
three of the (five or six) anomalies in a cluster in order to be included in that cluster’s factor.
Also, in order for an anomaly to be included in the mispricing measure for its cluster at the end of
month t− 1, we require at least 30 stocks to have non-missing values for that anomaly. The values
computed at the end of month t− 1 for each anomaly are constructed as follows:
1. Net Stock Issues: The stock issuing market has long been viewed as producing an anomaly
arising from sentiment-driven mispricing: smart managers issue shares when sentiment-driven
traders push prices to overvalued levels. Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) show
that, in post-issue years, equity issuers underperform matching nonissuers with similar char-
acteristics. Motivated by this evidence, Fama and French (2008) show that net stock issues
and subsequent returns are negatively correlated. Following Fama and French (2008), we
measure net issuance as the annual log change in split-adjusted shares outstanding. Split-
adjusted shares equal shares outstanding (Compustat annual item CSHO) times the adjust-
ment factor (Compustat annual item ADJEX C). The most recent reporting year used is the
one that ends (according to item DATADATE) at least four months before the end of month
t− 1. Stocks with negative net issues are assigned to decile 1, and those with zero net issues
are assigned to decile 2. The remaining stocks are assigned to the remaining eight deciles
using NYSE breakpoints.
2. Composite Equity Issues: Daniel and Titman (2006) find that issuers underperform nonis-
suers using a measure they denote as composite equity issuance, defined as the growth in
the firm’s total market value of equity minus (i.e., not attributable to) the stock’s rate of
return. We compute this measure by subtracting the 12-month cumulative stock return from
the 12-month growth in equity market capitalization. We lag the quantity four months, to
make its timing more coincident with the above measure of net stock issues.
3. Accruals: Sloan (1996) shows that firms with high accruals earn abnormally lower average
returns than firms with low accruals, and he suggests that investors overestimate the persis-
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tence of the accrual component of earnings when forming earnings expectations. Following
Sloan (1996), we measure total accruals as the annual change in noncash working capital mi-
nus depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat annual item DP), divided by average
total assets (item AT) for the previous two fiscal years. Noncash working capital is com-
puted as the change in current assets (item ACT) minus the change in cash and short-term
investment (item CHE), minus the change in current liabilities (item DLC), plus the change
in debt included in current liabilities (item LCT), plus the change in income taxes payable
(item TXP). The most recent reporting year used is the one that ends (according to item
DATADATE) at least four months before the end of month t− 1.
4. Net Operating Assets: Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004) find that net operating
assets, defined as the difference on the balance sheet between all operating assets and all
operating liabilities, scaled by total assets, is a strong negative predictor of long-run stock
returns. The authors suggest that investors with limited attention tend to focus on accounting
profitability, neglecting information about cash profitability, in which case net operating
assets (equivalently measured as the cumulative difference between operating income and
free cash flow) captures such a bias. Following equations equations (4), (5), and (6) of
that study, we measure net operation assets as operating assets minus operating liabilities,
divided by lagged total assets (Compustat annual item AT). Operating assets equal total
assets (item AT) minus cash and short-term investment (item CHE). Operating liabilities
equal total assets minus debt included in current liabilities (item DLC), minus long-term
debt (item DLTT), minus common equity (item CEQ), minus minority interests (item MIB),
minus preferred stocks (item PSTK). (The last two items are zero if missing.) The most
recent reporting year used is the one that ends (according to item DATADATE) at least four
months before the end of month t− 1.
5. Asset Growth: Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) find that companies that grow their total
assets more earn lower subsequent returns. They suggest that this phenomenon is due to
investors’ initial overreaction to changes in future business prospects implied by asset ex-
pansions. Asset growth is measured as the growth rate of total assets in the previous fiscal
year. Following that study, we measure asset growth as the most recent year-over-year annual
growth rate of total assets (Compustat annual item AT). The most recent reporting year used
is the one that ends (according to item DATADATE) at least four months before the end of
month t− 1.
6. Investment-to-Assets: Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) and Xing (2008) show that higher
past investment predicts abnormally lower future returns. Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) at-
tribute this anomaly to investors’ initial underreaction to overinvestment caused by managers’
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empire-building behavior. Here, investment to assets is measured as the annual change in
gross property, plant, and equipment, plus the annual change in inventories, scaled by lagged
book value of assets. Following the above studies, we compute investment-to-assets as the
changes in gross property, plant, and equipment (Compustat annual item PPEGT) plus
changes in inventory (item INVT), divided by lagged total assets (item AT). The most re-
cent reporting year used is the one that ends (according to item DATADATE) at least four
months before the end of month t− 1.
7. Distress: Financial distress is often invoked to explain otherwise anomalous patterns in the
cross-section of stock returns. However, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) find that
firms with high failure probability have lower rather than higher subsequent returns. The
authors suggest that their finding is a challenge to standard models of rational asset pricing.
Failure probability is estimated with a dynamic logit model that uses several equity market
variables, such as stock price, book-to-market, stock volatility, size relative to the S&P 500,
and cumulative excess return relative to the S&P 500. Specifically, using the above study’s
equations (2) and (3) along with its Table IV (12-month column), we compute the distress
anomaly measure—failure probability—as
pi = −20.26NIMTAAVG+ 1.42TLMTA− 7.13EXRETAVG+ 1.41 SIGMA
−0.045RSIZE− 2.13CASHMTA+ 0.075MB− 0.058PRICE− 9.16,
where
NIMTAAVGt−1,t−12 =
1− φ3
1− φ12
(NIMTAt−1,t−3 + · · ·+ φ
9NIMTAt−10,t−12)
EXRETAVGt−1,t−12 =
1− φ
1− φ12
(EXRETt−1 + · · ·+ φ
11EXRETt−12),
and φ = 2−1/3. NIMTA is net income (Compustat quarterly item NIQ) divided by firm
scale, where the latter is computed as the sum of total liabilities (item LTQ) and market
equity capitalization (data from CRSP). EXRETs is the stock’s monthly log return in month
s minus the log return on the S&P500 index. Missing values for NIMTA and EXRET are
replaced by those quantities’ cross-sectional means. TLMTA equals total liabilities divided by
firm scale. SIGMA is the stock’s daily standard deviation for the most recent three months,
expressed on an annualized basis. At least five non-zero daily returns are required. RSIZE
is the log of the ratio of the stock’s market capitalization to that of the S&P500 index.
CASHMTA equals cash and short-term investment (item CHEQ) divided by firm scale. MB
is the market-to-book ratio. Following Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), we increase
book equity by 10% of the difference between market equity and book equity. If the resulting
value of book equity is negative, then book equity is set to $1. PRICE is the log of the share
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price, truncated above at $15. All explanatory variables except PRICE are winsorized above
and below at the 5% level in the cross section. CRSP based variables, EXRETAVG, SIGMA,
RSIZE and PRICE are for month t − 1. NIQ is for the most recent quarter for which the
reporting date provided by Compustat (item RDQ) precedes the end of month t−1, whereas
the items requiring information from the balance sheet (LTQ, CHEQ and MB) are for the
prior quarter.
8. O-score: This distress measure, from Ohlson (1980), predicts returns in a manner similar
to the measure above. It is the probability of bankruptcy estimated in a static model using
accounting variables. Following Ohlson (1980), we construct it as:
O = −0.407 SIZE+ 6.03TLTA− 1.43WCTA+ 0.076CLCA− 1.72OENEG
= −2.37NITA− 1.83FUTL+ 0.285 INTWO− 0.521CHIN− 1.32,
where SIZE is the log of total assets (Compustat annual item AT), TLTA is the book value
of debt (item DLC plus item DLTT) divided by total assets, WCTA is working capital
(item ACT minus item LCT) divided by total assets, CLCA is current liabilities (item LCT)
divided by current assets (item ACT), ONEEG is 1 if total liabilities (item LT) exceed
total assets and is zero otherwise, NITA is net income (item NI) divided by total assets,
FUTL is funds provided by operations (item PI) divided by total liabilities, INTWO is equal
to 1 if net income (item NI) is negative for the last 2 years and zero otherwise, CHIN is
(NIj − NIj−1)/(|NIj| + |NIj−1|), in which NIj is the income (item NI) for year j, which
is the most recent reporting year that ends (according to item DATADATE) at least four
months before the end of month t− 1.
9. Momentum: The momentum effect, discovered by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), is one of
the most robust anomalies in asset pricing. It refers to the phenomenon whereby high (low)
past recent recent returns forecast high (low) future returns. The momentum ranking at the
end of month t-1 uses the cumulative returns from month t-12 to month t-2. This is the
choice of ranking variable used by Carhart (1997) to construct the widely used momentum
factor.
10. Gross Profitability Premium: Novy-Marx (2013) shows that sorting on the ratio of gross
profit to assets creates abnormal benchmark-adjusted returns, with more profitable firms
having higher returns than less profitable ones. He argues that gross profit is the cleanest
accounting measure of true economic profitability. The farther down the income statement
one goes, the more polluted profitability measures become, and the less related they are
to true economic profitability. Following that study, we measure gross profitability as total
revenue (Compustat annual item REVT) minus the cost of goods sold (item COGS), divided
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by current total assets (item AT). The most recent reporting year used is the one that ends
(according to item DATADATE) at least four months before the end of month t− 1.
11. Return on Assets: Fama and French (2006) find that more profitable firms have higher
expected returns than less profitable firms. Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2010) show that
firms with higher past return on assets earn abnormally higher subsequent returns. Return
on assets is measured as the ratio of quarterly earnings to last quarter’s assets. Wang and
Yu (2013) find that the anomaly exists primarily among firms with high arbitrage costs and
high information uncertainty, suggesting that mispricing is a culprit. Following Chen, Novy-
Marx, and Zhang (2010), we compute return on assets as income before extraordinary items
(Compustat quarterly item IBQ) divided by the previous quarter’s total assets (item ATQ).
Income is for the most recent quarter for which the reporting date provided by Compustat
(item RDQ) precedes the end of month t− 1, and assets are for the prior quarter.
The Larger Set of 73 Anomalies
We list here the 73 anomalies for which long-short returns were generously provided by the
authors of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a, 2015b). See those studies for detailed explanations and
references. The anomalies are grouped into six categories:
1. Momentum
SUE-1: Earnings surprise (1-month holding period)
SUE-6: Earnings surprise (6-month holding period)
Abr-1: Cumulative abnormal stock returns around earnings announcements
(1-month holding period)
Abr-6: Cumulative abnormal stock returns around earnings announcements
(6-month holding period)
RE-1: Revisions in analysts earnings forecasts (1-month holding period)
RE-6: Revisions in analysts earnings forecasts (6-month holding period)
R6-1: Price momentum (6-month prior returns, 1-month holding period)
R6-6: Price momentum (6-month prior returns, 6-month holding period)
R11-1: Price momentum, (11-month prior returns, 1-month holding period)
I-Mom: Industry momentum
2. Value-versus-growth
B/M: Book-to-market equity
A/ME: Market Leverage
Rev: Reversal
E/P: Earnings-to-price
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EF/P: Analysts earnings forecasts-to-price
CF/P: Cash flow-to-price
D/P: Dividend yield
O/P: Payout yield
NO/P: Net payout yield
SG: Sales growth
LTG: Long-term growth forecasts of analysts
Dur: Equity duration
3. Investment
ACI: Abnormal corporate investment
I/A: Investment-to-assets
NOA: Net operating assets
∆PI/A: Changes in property, plant, and equipment plus changes in inventory
scaled by assets
IG: Investment growth
NSI: Net stock issues
CEI: Composite issuance
NXF: Net external financing
IvG: Inventory growth
IvC: Inventory changes
OA: Operating accruals
TA: Total accruals
POA: Percent operating accruals
PTA: Percent total accruals
4. Profitability
ROE: Return on equity
ROA: Return on assets
RNA: Return on net operating assets
PM: Profit margin
ATO: Asset turnover
CTO: Capital turnover
GP/A: Gross profits-to-assets
F : F -score
TES: Tax expense surprise
TI/BI: Taxable income-to-book income
RS: Revenue surprise
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NEI: Number of consecutive quarters with earnings increases
FP: Failure probability
O: O-score
5. Intangibles
OC/A: Organizational capital-to-assets
BC/A: Brand capital-to-assets
Ad/M: Advertisement expense-to-market
RD/S: R&D-to-sales
RD/M: R&D-to-market
RC/A: R&D capital-to-assets
H/N: Hiring rate
OL: Operating leverage
G: Corporate governance
AccQ: Accrual quality
6. Trading frictions
ME: Market equity
Ivol: Idiosyncratic volatility
Tvol: Total volatility
Svol: Systematic volatility
MDR: Maximum daily return
β: Market beta
D-β: Dimsons beta
S-Rev: Short-term reversal
Disp: Dispersion of analysts earnings forecasts
Turn: Share turnover
1/P: 1/share price
Dvol: Dollar trading volume
Illiq: Illiquidity as absolute return-to-volume
Anomalies Eliminated in Producing Table 6
We eliminate the five anomalies from the above set of 73 that are most highly correlated with
each factor other than the market and size factors, in both models q-4 and M-4. The two relevant
factors in model q-4 are investment (I/A) and profitability (ROE), while in model M-4 they are
the mispricing factors, MGMT and PERF . In Panel A of Table 6, the anomalies that each factor
eliminates are as follows:
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I/A: CEI, H/N, I/A, LTG, SG
ROE: Disp, FP, 1/P, ROA, ROE
MGMT : CEI, LTG, NO/P, O/P, Turn
PERF : FP, R11-1, R6-1, R6-6, ROA
In Panel B of Table 6, the anomalies eliminated:
I/A: A/ME, B/M, H/N, I/A, SG
ROE: Disp, FP, NEI, ROA, ROE
MGMT : CEI, LTG, NO/P, NXF, O/P
PERF : FP, 1/P, R11-1, R6-1, R6-6
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This appendix contains the robustness results discussed in subsection 4.4 as well as the
results for the models adding a momentum or liquidity factor, as discussed at the end of
subsection 4.1. Tables B1 through B15 recompute Tables 5, 6, and 7 with the following
modifications to the original procedure:
1. Reconstruct the M-4 factors using mispricing-measure breakpoints of 30% and 70%
instead of 20% and 80% (Tables B1, B5, and B9).
2. Reconstruct the M-4 factors using mispricing-measure breakpoints for the NYSE in-
stead of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ (Tables B2, B6, and B10).
3. Reconstruct the M-4 SMB factor by averaging across the three mispricing categories
instead of using only stocks in the middle category (Table B3, B7, and B11).
4. Incorporate all of the above simultaneously (Tables B4, B8, and B12).
5. Reconstruct annual-data factors in models FF-3, FF-5, and q-4 with a minimum gap
of 4 months after the end of the fiscal year instead of a gap of 6 to 18 months (Tables
B13–B15).
Tables B16 through B25 recompute Tables 5, 7, 9, 10 and 11 in each of two subperiods:
1967–1990 (24 years) and 1991–2013 (23 years). Table B26 reports results when models
MOM-4 and LIQ-4 are added to Table 5. Figures B1 through B3 report rolling subperiod
comparisons of anomalies’ average absolute alphas obtained under model M-4 versus models
FF-5 and q-4.
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Table B1
Summary Measures of Models’ Abilities to Explain Anomalies,
Factors Constructed Using 30% and 70% Breakpoints
This table recomputes Table 5 with the factors constructed using mispricing-measure breakpoints of 30% and
70% instead of 20% and 80%. The table reports measures that summarize the degree to which anomalies produce
alpha under four different factor models: the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), denoted FF-3; the
five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang
(2015a), denoted q-4; and the four-factor mispricing-factor model introduced in this study, denoted M-4. Also
reported are measures based on the average unadjusted return spreads (the alphas in a model with no factors).
For each model, the table reports the average absolute alpha, average absolute t-statistic, the F -statistic and
associated p-value for the “GRS” test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989), and the number of anomalies for
which the model produces the smallest absolute alpha among the models being compared in the table. In Panel
A, two versions of the GRS test are reported. Data for the distress anomaly begin in October 1974, and data for
the return-on-assets anomaly begin in November 1971. The other ten anomalies begin at the start of the sample
period, which is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months). GRS10 tests whether the ten alphas
for the full-sample anomalies equal zero, while GRS12 uses all 12 anomalies and begins the sample in October
1974. Panels B and C also report two versions of the GRS test: GRS51 uses 51 anomalies whose data are available
by January 1967, while GRS72 use those anomalies plus 21 others whose data are available by February 1986.
Measure Unadjusted FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: 12 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.52 0.67 0.45 0.34 0.16
Average |t| 3.14 4.44 2.93 2.34 1.18
GRS10 6.89 10.10 6.71 5.99 1.84
p10 3.4×10
−10 1.1×10−15 6.9×10−10 1.2×10−8 0.05
GRS12 6.16 7.71 4.17 3.95 1.73
p12 4.5×10
−10 4.2×10−13 3.1×10−6 8.3×10−6 0.06
Number of min|α| - 0 1 2 9
Panel B: 73 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.39 0.44 0.30 0.20 0.18
Average |t| 2.14 2.74 1.77 1.15 0.99
GRS51 2.74 2.60 1.91 1.68 1.34
p51 9.3×10
−9 6.5×10−8 2.9×10−4 3.2×10−3 0.06
GRS72 2.23 2.10 1.79 1.78 1.60
p72 2.2×10
−6 1.3×10−5 5.3×10−4 5.8×10−4 4.1×10−3
Number of min|α| - 10 10 23 30
Panel C: 73 Anomalies, equally weighted, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.50 0.53 0.35 0.23 0.21
Average |t| 3.02 3.72 2.41 1.44 1.30
GRS51 5.85 6.31 5.15 4.19 4.11
p51 2.7×10
−27 6.2×10−30 4.3×10−23 2.3×10−17 6.7×10−17
GRS72 2.95 3.25 2.64 2.41 2.45
p72 1.4×10
−10 3.0×10−12 1.1×10−8 2.3×10−7 1.3×10−7
Number of min|α| - 7 13 23 30
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Table B2
Summary Measures of Models’ Abilities to Explain Anomalies,
Factors Constructed Using NYSE Breakpoints
This table recomputes Table 5 with the factors constructed using mispricing-measure breakpoints for the NYSE
instead of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ. The table reports measures that summarize the degree to which anomalies
produce alpha under four different factor models: the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), denoted
FF-3; the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and
Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4; and the four-factor mispricing-factor model introduced in this study, denoted M-4.
Also reported are measures based on the average unadjusted return spreads (the alphas in a model with no
factors). For each model, the table reports the average absolute alpha, average absolute t-statistic, the F -statistic
and associated p-value for the “GRS” test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989), and the number of anomalies
for which the model produces the smallest absolute alpha among the models being compared in the table. In
Panel A, two versions of the GRS test are reported. Data for the distress anomaly begin in October 1974, and
data for the return-on-assets anomaly begin in November 1971. The other ten anomalies begin at the start of
the sample period, which is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months). GRS10 tests whether the
ten alphas for the full-sample anomalies equal zero, while GRS12 uses all 12 anomalies and begins the sample in
October 1974. Panels B and C also report two versions of the GRS test: GRS51 uses 51 anomalies whose data are
available by January 1967, while GRS72 use those anomalies plus 21 others whose data are available by February
1986.
Measure Unadjusted FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: 12 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.52 0.67 0.45 0.34 0.15
Average |t| 3.14 4.44 2.93 2.34 1.13
GRS10 6.89 10.10 6.71 5.99 1.80
p10 3.4×10
−10 1.1×10−15 6.9×10−10 1.2×10−8 0.06
GRS12 6.16 7.71 4.17 3.95 1.81
p12 4.5×10
−10 4.2×10−13 3.1×10−6 8.3×10−6 0.04
Number of min|α| - 0 1 2 9
Panel B: 73 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.39 0.44 0.30 0.20 0.18
Average |t| 2.14 2.74 1.77 1.15 0.98
GRS51 2.74 2.60 1.91 1.68 1.24
p51 9.3×10
−9 6.5×10−8 2.9×10−4 3.2×10−3 0.13
GRS72 2.23 2.10 1.79 1.78 1.55
p72 2.2×10
−6 1.3×10−5 5.3×10−4 5.8×10−4 7.3×10−3
Number of min|α| - 10 11 20 32
Panel C: 73 Anomalies, equally weighted, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.50 0.53 0.35 0.23 0.21
Average |t| 3.02 3.72 2.41 1.44 1.32
GRS51 5.85 6.31 5.15 4.19 4.06
p51 2.7×10
−27 6.2×10−30 4.3×10−23 2.3×10−17 1.4×10−16
GRS72 2.95 3.25 2.64 2.41 2.59
p72 1.4×10
−10 3.0×10−12 1.1×10−8 2.3×10−7 2.2×10−8
Number of min|α| - 7 10 25 31
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Table B3
Summary Measures of Models’ Abilities to Explain Anomalies,
SMB Constructed by Averaging Across Mispricing Categories
This table recomputes Table 5 with the SMB factor constructed by averaging across the three mispricing cate-
gories instead of using only stocks in the middle category. The table reports measures that summarize the degree
to which anomalies produce alpha under four different factor models: the three-factor model of Fama and French
(1993), denoted FF-3; the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5; the four-factor model of
Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4; and the four-factor mispricing-factor model introduced in this study,
denoted M-4. Also reported are measures based on the average unadjusted return spreads (the alphas in a model
with no factors). For each model, the table reports the average absolute alpha, average absolute t-statistic, the
F -statistic and associated p-value for the “GRS” test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989), and the number of
anomalies for which the model produces the smallest absolute alpha among the models being compared in the
table. In Panel A, two versions of the GRS test are reported. Data for the distress anomaly begin in October 1974,
and data for the return-on-assets anomaly begin in November 1971. The other ten anomalies begin at the start
of the sample period, which is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months). GRS10 tests whether
the ten alphas for the full-sample anomalies equal zero, while GRS12 uses all 12 anomalies and begins the sample
in October 1974. Panels B and C also report two versions of the GRS test: GRS51 uses 51 anomalies whose
data are available by January 1967, while GRS72 use those anomalies plus 21 others whose data are available by
February 1986.
Measure Unadjusted FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: 12 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.52 0.67 0.45 0.34 0.17
Average |t| 3.14 4.44 2.93 2.34 1.23
GRS10 6.89 10.10 6.71 5.99 1.76
p10 3.4×10
−10 1.1×10−15 6.9×10−10 1.2×10−8 0.06
GRS12 6.16 7.71 4.17 3.95 1.71
p12 4.5×10
−10 4.2×10−13 3.1×10−6 8.3×10−6 0.06
Number of min|α| - 0 1 2 9
Panel B: 73 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.39 0.44 0.30 0.20 0.19
Average |t| 2.14 2.74 1.77 1.15 1.06
GRS51 2.74 2.60 1.91 1.68 1.35
p51 9.3×10
−9 6.5×10−8 2.9×10−4 3.2×10−3 0.06
GRS72 2.23 2.10 1.79 1.78 1.61
p72 2.2×10
−6 1.3×10−5 5.3×10−4 5.8×10−4 3.9×10−3
Number of min|α| - 9 12 24 28
Panel C: 73 Anomalies, equally weighted, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.50 0.53 0.35 0.23 0.21
Average |t| 3.02 3.72 2.41 1.44 1.34
GRS51 5.85 6.31 5.15 4.19 4.04
p51 2.7×10
−27 6.2×10−30 4.3×10−23 2.3×10−17 1.8×10−16
GRS72 2.95 3.25 2.64 2.41 2.38
p72 1.4×10
−10 3.0×10−12 1.1×10−8 2.3×10−7 3.2×10−7
Number of min|α| - 8 13 21 31
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Table B4
Summary Measures of Models’ Abilities to Explain Anomalies,
Factors Constructed Using All Modifications in Tables B1–B3
This table recomputes Table 5 with the factors constructed using mispricing-measure breakpoints of 30% and
70% for the NYSE instead of 20% and 80% for NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ. Also, the SMB factor is constructed
by averaging across the three mispricing categories instead of using only stocks in the middle category. The
table reports measures that summarize the degree to which anomalies produce alpha under four different factor
models: the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), denoted FF-3; the five-factor model of Fama and
French (2015), denoted FF-5; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4; and the four-
factor mispricing-factor model introduced in this study, denoted M-4. Also reported are measures based on the
average unadjusted return spreads (the alphas in a model with no factors). For each model, the table reports
the average absolute alpha, average absolute t-statistic, the F -statistic and associated p-value for the “GRS” test
of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989), and the number of anomalies for which the model produces the smallest
absolute alpha among the models being compared in the table. In Panel A, two versions of the GRS test are
reported. Data for the distress anomaly begin in October 1974, and data for the return-on-assets anomaly begin
in November 1971. The other ten anomalies begin at the start of the sample period, which is from January 1967
through December 2013 (564 months). GRS10 tests whether the ten alphas for the full-sample anomalies equal
zero, while GRS12 uses all 12 anomalies and begins the sample in October 1974. Panels B and C also report two
versions of the GRS test: GRS51 uses 51 anomalies whose data are available by January 1967, while GRS72 use
those anomalies plus 21 others whose data are available by February 1986.
Measure Unadjusted FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: 12 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.52 0.67 0.45 0.34 0.16
Average |t| 3.14 4.44 2.93 2.34 1.22
GRS10 6.89 10.10 6.71 5.99 2.26
p10 3.4×10
−10 1.1×10−15 6.9×10−10 1.2×10−8 0.01
GRS12 6.16 7.71 4.17 3.95 2.14
p12 4.5×10
−10 4.2×10−13 3.1×10−6 8.3×10−6 0.01
Number of min|α| - 0 1 1 10
Panel B: 73 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.39 0.44 0.30 0.20 0.18
Average |t| 2.14 2.74 1.77 1.15 1.02
GRS51 2.74 2.60 1.91 1.68 1.34
p51 9.3×10
−9 6.5×10−8 2.9×10−4 3.2×10−3 0.07
GRS72 2.23 2.10 1.79 1.78 1.59
p72 2.2×10
−6 1.3×10−5 5.3×10−4 5.8×10−4 4.8×10−3
Number of min|α| - 10 9 21 33
Panel C: 73 Anomalies, equally weighted, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.50 0.53 0.35 0.23 0.22
Average |t| 3.02 3.72 2.41 1.44 1.38
GRS51 5.85 6.31 5.15 4.19 4.29
p51 2.7×10
−27 6.2×10−30 4.3×10−23 2.3×10−17 6.2×10−18
GRS72 2.95 3.25 2.64 2.41 2.47
p72 1.4×10
−10 3.0×10−12 1.1×10−8 2.3×10−7 1.0×10−7
Number of min|α| - 5 13 26 29
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Table B5
Summary Measures of Models’ Abilities to Explain Anomalies
Less Correlated with Factors in Models q-4 and M-4,
Factors Constructed Using 30% and 70% Breakpoints
This table recomputes Table 6 with the factors constructed using mispricing-measure breakpoints of 30% and 70%
instead of 20% and 80%. The table reports measures that summarize the degree to which anomalies produce alpha
under four different factor models: the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), denoted FF-3; the five-
factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a),
denoted q-4; and the four-factor mispricing-factor model introduced in this study, denoted M-4. Also reported
are measures based on the average unadjusted return spreads (the alphas in a model with no factors). For each
model, the table reports the average absolute alpha, average absolute t-statistic, the F -statistic and associated
p-value for the “GRS” test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989), and the number of anomalies for which the
model produces the smallest absolute alpha among the models being compared in the table. Panels A and B
correspond to Panels B and C of Table 5, except the set of anomalies is reduced: For each of four factors—those
in models q-4 and M-4 other than the market and size factors—the five anomalies (of the 73) whose long-short
returns are most highly correlated with the factor are eliminated. This procedure leaves 56 anomalies in Panel A
and 54 in Panel B. The sample period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months). Two versions
of the GRS test are reported: GRS41 in Panel A (or GRS40 in Panel B) uses the 41 (or 40) anomalies whose
data are available by January 1967, while GRS55 in Panel A (or GRS53 in Panel B) uses the remaining anomalies
whose data are available by February 1986.
Measure Unadjusted FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: 56 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.37 0.38 0.26 0.20 0.18
Average |t| 2.13 2.57 1.69 1.17 1.00
GRS41 3.01 2.81 1.95 1.63 1.35
p41 6.7×10
−9 6.1×10−8 5.8×10−4 9.3×10−3 0.08
GRS55 2.28 2.17 1.75 1.66 1.58
p55 7.2×10
−6 2.5×10−5 2.0×10−3 4.5×10−3 9.8×10−3
Number of min|α| - 7 7 19 23
Number of min|α|, q-4 vs. M-4 - - - 27 29
Panel B: 54 Anomalies, equally weighted, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.45 0.46 0.32 0.25 0.22
Average |t| 2.94 3.53 2.41 1.61 1.42
GRS40 6.38 7.03 5.78 4.69 4.54
p40 7.3×10
−26 5.0×10−29 8.3×10−23 2.9×10−17 1.8×10−16
GRS53 3.36 4.07 3.12 2.82 2.87
p53 3.6×10
−11 1.0×10−14 6.7×10−10 2.0×10−8 1.2×10−8
Number of min|α| - 6 11 16 21
Number of min|α|, q-4 vs. M-4 - - - 21 33
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Table B6
Summary Measures of Models’ Abilities to Explain Anomalies
Less Correlated with Factors in Models q-4 and M-4,
Factors Constructed Using NYSE Breakpoints
This table recomputes Table 6 with the factors constructed using mispricing-measure breakpoints for the NYSE
instead of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ. The table reports measures that summarize the degree to which anomalies
produce alpha under four different factor models: the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), denoted
FF-3; the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and
Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4; and the four-factor mispricing-factor model introduced in this study, denoted M-4.
Also reported are measures based on the average unadjusted return spreads (the alphas in a model with no
factors). For each model, the table reports the average absolute alpha, average absolute t-statistic, the F -statistic
and associated p-value for the “GRS” test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989), and the number of anomalies
for which the model produces the smallest absolute alpha among the models being compared in the table. Panels
A and B correspond to Panels B and C of Table 5, except the set of anomalies is reduced: For each of four
factors—those in models q-4 and M-4 other than the market and size factors—the five anomalies (of the 73)
whose long-short returns are most highly correlated with the factor are eliminated. This procedure leaves 56
anomalies in Panel A and 54 in Panel B. The sample period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564
months). Two versions of the GRS test are reported: GRS40 uses the 40 anomalies whose data are available
by January 1967, while GRS55 in Panel A (or GRS53 in Panel B) uses the remaining anomalies whose data are
available by February 1986.
Measure Unadjusted FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: 56 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.36 0.38 0.26 0.20 0.17
Average |t| 2.13 2.58 1.70 1.17 0.95
GRS40 3.08 2.89 2.00 1.66 1.15
p40 3.9×10
−9 3.6×10−8 4.0×10−4 8.0×10−3 0.25
GRS55 2.28 2.14 1.70 1.61 1.42
p55 7.3×10
−6 3.3×10−5 3.3×10−3 7.1×10−3 0.04
Number of min|α| - 7 8 15 26
Number of min|α|, q-4 vs. M-4 - - - 22 34
Panel B: 54 Anomalies, equally weighted, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.45 0.46 0.32 0.25 0.22
Average |t| 2.94 3.53 2.41 1.61 1.42
GRS40 6.38 7.03 5.78 4.69 4.40
p40 7.3×10
−26 5.0×10−29 8.3×10−23 2.9×10−17 8.8×10−16
GRS53 3.36 4.07 3.12 2.82 3.00
p53 3.6×10
−11 1.0×10−14 6.7×10−10 2.0×10−8 2.5×10−9
Number of min|α| - 6 8 18 22
Number of min|α|, q-4 vs. M-4 - - - 25 29
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Table B7
Summary Measures of Models’ Abilities to Explain Anomalies
Less Correlated with Factors in Models q-4 and M-4, SMB
Constructed by Averaging Across Mispricing Categories
This table recomputes Table 6 with the SMB factor constructed by averaging across the three mispricing cate-
gories instead of using only stocks in the middle category. The table reports measures that summarize the degree
to which anomalies produce alpha under four different factor models: the three-factor model of Fama and French
(1993), denoted FF-3; the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5; the four-factor model of
Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4; and the four-factor mispricing-factor model introduced in this study,
denoted M-4. Also reported are measures based on the average unadjusted return spreads (the alphas in a model
with no factors). For each model, the table reports the average absolute alpha, average absolute t-statistic, the
F -statistic and associated p-value for the “GRS” test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989), and the number of
anomalies for which the model produces the smallest absolute alpha among the models being compared in the
table. Panels A and B correspond to Panels B and C of Table 5, except the set of anomalies is reduced: For each
of four factors—those in models q-4 and M-4 other than the market and size factors—the five anomalies (of the
73) whose long-short returns are most highly correlated with the factor are eliminated. This procedure leaves 57
anomalies in Panel A and 54 in Panel B. The sample period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564
months). Two versions of the GRS test are reported: GRS41 in Panel A (or GRS40 in Panel B) uses the 41 (or
40) anomalies whose data are available by January 1967, while GRS56 in Panel A (or GRS53 in Panel B) uses
the remaining anomalies whose data are available by February 1986.
Measure Unadjusted FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: 57 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.37 0.39 0.27 0.19 0.18
Average |t| 2.14 2.60 1.71 1.15 1.05
GRS41 3.01 2.81 1.95 1.63 1.36
p41 6.7×10
−9 6.1×10−8 5.8×10−4 9.3×10−3 0.07
GRS56 2.29 2.16 1.73 1.64 1.59
p56 5.5×10
−6 2.5×10−5 2.3×10−3 5.2×10−3 8.3×10−3
Number of min|α| - 6 9 20 22
Number of min|α|, q-4 vs. M-4 - - - 27 30
Panel B: 54 Anomalies, equally weighted, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.45 0.46 0.32 0.25 0.23
Average |t| 2.94 3.53 2.41 1.61 1.47
GRS40 6.38 7.03 5.78 4.69 4.55
p40 7.3×10
−26 5.0×10−29 8.3×10−23 2.9×10−17 1.6×10−16
GRS53 3.36 4.07 3.12 2.82 3.03
p53 3.6×10
−11 1.0×10−14 6.7×10−10 2.0×10−8 1.8×10−9
Number of min|α| - 6 9 16 23
Number of min|α|, q-4 vs. M-4 - - - 21 33
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Table B8
Summary Measures of Models’ Abilities to Explain Anomalies
Less Correlated with Factors in Models q-4 and M-4, Factors
Constructed Using All Modifications in Tables B5–B7
This table recomputes Table 6 with the factors constructed using mispricing-measure breakpoints of 30% and
70% for the NYSE instead of 20% and 80% for NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ. Also, the SMB factor is constructed
by averaging across the three mispricing categories instead of using only stocks in the middle category. The
table reports measures that summarize the degree to which anomalies produce alpha under four different factor
models: the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), denoted FF-3; the five-factor model of Fama and
French (2015), denoted FF-5; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4; and the four-
factor mispricing-factor model introduced in this study, denoted M-4. Also reported are measures based on the
average unadjusted return spreads (the alphas in a model with no factors). For each model, the table reports
the average absolute alpha, average absolute t-statistic, the F -statistic and associated p-value for the “GRS” test
of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989), and the number of anomalies for which the model produces the smallest
absolute alpha among the models being compared in the table. Panels A and B correspond to Panels B and C of
Table 5, except the set of anomalies is reduced: For each of four factors—those in models q-4 and M-4 other than
the market and size factors—the five anomalies (of the 73) whose long-short returns are most highly correlated
with the factor are eliminated. This procedure leaves 56 anomalies in Panel A and 55 in Panel B. The sample
period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months). Two versions of the GRS test are reported:
GRS41 in Panel A (or GRS40 in Panel B) uses the 41 (or 40) anomalies whose data are available by January
1967, while GRS55 in Panel A (or GRS54 in Panel B) uses the remaining anomalies whose data are available by
February 1986.
Measure Unadjusted FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: 56 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.37 0.38 0.26 0.20 0.18
Average |t| 2.13 2.57 1.69 1.17 1.03
GRS41 3.01 2.81 1.95 1.63 1.34
p41 6.7×10
−9 6.1×10−8 5.8×10−4 9.3×10−3 0.08
GRS55 2.28 2.17 1.75 1.66 1.58
p55 7.2×10
−6 2.5×10−5 2.0×10−3 4.5×10−3 0.01
Number of min|α| - 7 6 17 26
Number of min|α|, q-4 vs. M-4 - - - 27 29
Panel B: 55 Anomalies, equally weighted, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.45 0.47 0.32 0.25 0.23
Average |t| 2.96 3.57 2.42 1.61 1.49
GRS40 6.38 7.03 5.78 4.69 4.69
p40 7.3×10
−26 5.0×10−29 8.3×10−23 2.9×10−17 3.1×10−17
GRS54 3.33 3.99 3.07 2.78 2.88
p54 3.8×10
−11 1.9×10−14 9.5×10−10 2.6×10−8 8.1×10−9
Number of min|α| - 4 10 18 23
Number of min|α|, q-4 vs. M-4 - - - 25 30
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Table B9
Models’ Abilities to Explain Each Other’s Factors, Factors
Constructed Using 30% and 70% Breakpoints
This table recomputes Table 7 with the factors constructed using mispricing-measure breakpoints of 30% and
70% instead of 20% and 80%. Panel A reports a factor’s estimated monthly alpha (in percent) with respect to
each of the other models (with White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses). Panel B
computes the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (1989) F -test of whether a given model produces zero alphas for the factors
of an alternative model(with p-values in parentheses). The models considered are the five-factor model of Fama
and French (2015), denoted FF-5, which includes the factors HML, RMW , and CMA; the four-factor model
of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4, which includes the factors I/A and ROE; and the four-factor
mispricing-factor model, denoted M-4, which includes the factors MGMT and PERF . The sample period is
from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months).
Alpha computed with respect to model
Factors FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: Alpha (t-statistic)
Factors in FF-5
HML - 0.04 0.05
(0.43) (0.50)
RMW - 0.04 0.11
(0.55) (1.26)
CMA - 0.02 -0.02
(0.47) (-0.43)
Factors in q-4
I/A 0.12 - 0.09
(3.48) (1.57)
ROE 0.45 - 0.36
(5.53) (4.00)
Factors in M-4
MGMT 0.22 0.22 -
(4.23) (3.55)
PERF 0.48 0.26 -
(4.15) (2.15)
Panel B: GRS F -statistic (p-value)
HML, RMW , CMA - 0.23 0.53
(0.87) (0.66)
I/A, ROE 19.06 - 6.67
(9.8×10−9) (1.4×10−3)
MGMT , PERF 22.25 11.39 -
(5.1×10−10) (1.4×10−5)
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Table B10
Models’ Abilities to Explain Each Other’s Factors,
Factors Constructed Using NYSE Breakpoints
This table recomputes Table 7 with the factors constructed using mispricing-measure breakpoints for the NYSE
instead of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ. Panel A reports a factor’s estimated monthly alpha (in percent) with respect
to each of the other models (with White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses). Panel B
computes the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (1989) F -test of whether a given model produces zero alphas for the factors
of an alternative model(with p-values in parentheses). The models considered are the five-factor model of Fama
and French (2015), denoted FF-5, which includes the factors HML, RMW , and CMA; the four-factor model
of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4, which includes the factors I/A and ROE; and the four-factor
mispricing-factor model, denoted M-4, which includes the factors MGMT and PERF . The sample period is
from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months).
Alpha computed with respect to model
Factors FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: Alpha (t-statistic)
Factors in FF-5
HML - 0.04 0.03
(0.43) (0.29)
RMW - 0.04 0.13
(0.55) (1.50)
CMA - 0.02 -0.04
(0.47) (-0.63)
Factors in q-4
I/A 0.12 - 0.09
(3.48) (1.57)
ROE 0.45 - 0.36
(5.53) (4.00)
Factors in M-4
MGMT 0.29 0.31 -
(4.72) (4.38)
PERF 0.60 0.33 -
(4.46) (2.26)
Panel B: GRS F -statistic (p-value)
HML, RMW , CMA - 0.23 0.70
(0.87) (0.55)
I/A, ROE 19.06 - 7.56
(9.8×10−9) (5.7×10−4)
MGMT , PERF 26.84 16.02 -
(7.5×10−12) (1.7×10−7)
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Table B11
Models’ Abilities to Explain Each Other’s Factors, SMB
Constructed by Averaging Across Mispricing Categories
This table recomputes Table 7 with the SMB factor constructed by averaging across the three mispricing cate-
gories instead of using only stocks in the middle category. Panel A reports a factor’s estimated monthly alpha
(in percent) with respect to each of the other models (with White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics
in parentheses). Panel B computes the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (1989) F -test of whether a given model produces
zero alphas for the factors of an alternative model(with p-values in parentheses). The models considered are the
five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5, which includes the factors HML, RMW , and CMA;
the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4, which includes the factors I/A and ROE;
and the four-factor mispricing-factor model, denoted M-4, which includes the factors MGMT and PERF . The
sample period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months).
Alpha computed with respect to model
Factors FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: Alpha (t-statistic)
Factors in FF-5
HML - 0.04 -0.02
(0.43) (-0.19)
RMW - 0.04 0.10
(0.55) (1.16)
CMA - 0.02 -0.02
(0.47) (-0.40)
Factors in q-4
I/A 0.12 - 0.09
(3.48) (1.57)
ROE 0.45 - 0.36
(5.53) (4.00)
Factors in M-4
MGMT 0.33 0.36 -
(4.93) (4.54)
PERF 0.64 0.35 -
(4.17) (2.24)
Panel B: GRS F -statistic (p-value)
HML, RMW , CMA - 0.23 0.49
(0.87) (0.69)
I/A, ROE 19.06 - 8.89
(9.8×10−9) (1.6×10−4)
MGMT , PERF 25.35 15.66 -
(2.9×10−11) (2.4×10−7)
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Table B12
Models’ Abilities to Explain Each Other’s Factors, Factors
Constructed Using All Modifications in Tables B9–B11
This table recomputes Table 7 with the factors constructed using mispricing-measure breakpoints of 30% and
70% for the NYSE instead of 20% and 80% for NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ. Also, the SMB factor is constructed
by averaging across the three mispricing categories instead of using only stocks in the middle category. Panel
A reports a factor’s estimated monthly alpha (in percent) with respect to each of the other models (with White
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses). Panel B computes the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken
(1989) F -test of whether a given model produces zero alphas for the factors of an alternative model(with p-values
in parentheses). The models considered are the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5, which
includes the factors HML, RMW , and CMA; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted
q-4, which includes the factors I/A and ROE; and the four-factor mispricing-factor model, denoted M-4, which
includes the factors MGMT and PERF . The sample period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564
months).
Alpha computed with respect to model
Factors FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: Alpha (t-statistic)
Factors in FF-5
HML - 0.04 0.09
(0.43) (1.02)
RMW - 0.04 0.13
(0.55) (1.47)
CMA - 0.02 -0.02
(0.47) (-0.30)
Factors in q-4
I/A 0.12 - 0.09
(3.48) (1.57)
ROE 0.45 - 0.36
(5.53) (4.00)
Factors in M-4
MGMT 0.19 0.19 -
(3.90) (3.32)
PERF 0.49 0.28 -
(4.65) (2.48)
Panel B: GRS F -statistic (p-value)
HML, RMW , CMA - 0.23 0.91
(0.87) (0.44)
I/A, ROE 19.06 - 7.79
(9.8×10−9) (4.6×10−4)
MGMT , PERF 23.74 12.12 -
(1.3×10−10) (7.1×10−6)
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Table B13
Summary Measures of Models’ Abilities to Explain Anomalies, Annual-Data Factors
for Models FF-3, FF-5, and q-4 Reconstructed with Minimum Four-Month Gap
This table recomputes Table 5 after reconstructing factors in models FF-3, FF-5, and q-4 that use annual data.
A minimum gap of 4 months after the end of the fiscal year (instead of a gap of 6 to 18 months) is required
before using an annual variable in the factor construction, while using immediate prior-month values of market
capitalization. We apply this change to SMB and HML in model FF-3, to SMB, HML, RMW , and CMA in
model FF-5, and to I/A in model q-4. The table reports measures that summarize the degree to which anomalies
produce alpha under four different factor models: the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), denoted
FF-3; the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and
Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4; and the four-factor mispricing-factor model introduced in this study, denoted M-4.
Also reported are measures based on the average unadjusted return spreads (the alphas in a model with no
factors). For each model, the table reports the average absolute alpha, average absolute t-statistic, the F -statistic
and associated p-value for the “GRS” test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989), and the number of anomalies
for which the model produces the smallest absolute alpha among the models being compared in the table. In
Panel A, two versions of the GRS test are reported. Data for the distress anomaly begin in October 1974, and
data for the return-on-assets anomaly begin in November 1971. The other ten anomalies begin at the start of
the sample period, which is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months). GRS10 tests whether the
ten alphas for the full-sample anomalies equal zero, while GRS12 uses all 12 anomalies and begins the sample in
October 1974. Panels B and C also report two versions of the GRS test: GRS51 uses 51 anomalies whose data are
available by January 1967, while GRS72 use those anomalies plus 21 others whose data are available by February
1986.
Measure Unadjusted FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: 12 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.52 0.68 0.45 0.30 0.18
Average |t| 3.14 4.55 2.85 2.17 1.29
GRS10 6.89 11.47 7.59 5.83 1.84
p10 3.4×10
−10 5.5×10−10 2.2×10−11 2.2×10−8 0.05
GRS12 6.16 8.38 4.56 3.73 1.88
p12 4.5×10
−10 2.2×10−14 5.8×10−7 2.1×10−5 0.03
Number of min|α| - 0 1 3 8
Panel B: 73 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.39 0.44 0.32 0.21 0.18
Average |t| 2.14 2.73 1.90 1.20 0.99
GRS51 2.74 2.66 2.10 1.75 1.28
p51 9.3×10
−9 3.0×10−8 3.3×10−5 1.6×10−3 0.10
GRS72 2.23 2.14 1.67 1.83 1.54
p72 2.2×10
−6 7.2×10−6 2.0×10−3 3.3×10−4 8.1×10−3
Number of min|α| - 8 6 22 37
Panel C: 73 Anomalies, equally weighted, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.50 0.53 0.38 0.24 0.22
Average |t| 3.02 3.76 2.66 1.45 1.38
GRS51 5.85 6.43 5.43 4.28 4.17
p51 2.7×10
−27 1.2×10−30 8.9×10−25 6.5×10−18 3.1×10−17
GRS72 2.95 3.41 2.75 2.46 2.68
p72 1.4×10
−10 3.3×10−13 2.6×10−9 1.1×10−7 6.2×10−9
Number of min|α| - 7 6 27 33
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Table B14
Summary Measures of Models’ Abilities to Explain Anomalies Less Correlated
with Factors in Models q-4 and M-4, Annual-Data Factors for Models
FF-3, FF-5, and q-4 Reconstructed with Minimum Four-Month Gap
This table recomputes Table 6 after reconstructing factors in models FF-3, FF-5, and q-4 that use annual data.
A minimum gap of 4 months after the end of the fiscal year (instead of a gap of 6 to 18 months) is required
before using an annual variable in the factor construction, while using immediate prior-month values of market
capitalization. We apply this change to SMB and HML in model FF-3, to SMB, HML, RMW , and CMA in
model FF-5, and to I/A in model q-4. The table reports measures that summarize the degree to which anomalies
produce alpha under four different factor models: the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), denoted
FF-3; the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and
Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4; and the four-factor mispricing-factor model introduced in this study, denoted M-4.
Also reported are measures based on the average unadjusted return spreads (the alphas in a model with no
factors). For each model, the table reports the average absolute alpha, average absolute t-statistic, the F -statistic
and associated p-value for the “GRS” test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989), and the number of anomalies
for which the model produces the smallest absolute alpha among the models being compared in the table. Panels
A and B correspond to Panels B and C of Table 5, except the set of anomalies is reduced: For each of four
factors—those in models q-4 and M-4 other than the market and size factors—the five anomalies (of the 73)
whose long-short returns are most highly correlated with the factor are eliminated. This procedure leaves 57
anomalies in Panel A and 54 in Panel B. The sample period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564
months). Two versions of the GRS test are reported: GRS41 in Panel A (or GRS40 in Panel B) uses the 41 (or
40) anomalies whose data are available by January 1967, while GRS56 in Panel A (or GRS53 in Panel B) uses
the remaining anomalies whose data are available by February 1986.
Measure Unadjusted FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: 57 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.37 0.39 0.28 0.21 0.17
Average |t| 2.14 2.56 1.83 1.23 0.97
GRS41 3.01 2.87 2.15 1.71 1.26
p41 6.7×10
−9 3.2×10−8 7.7×10−5 4.7×10−3 0.13
GRS56 2.29 2.22 1.67 1.68 1.53
p56 5.5×10
−6 1.2×10−5 4.0×10−3 3.5×10−3 0.01
Number of min|α| - 6 4 17 30
Number of min|α|, q-4 vs. M-4 - - - 22 35
Panel B: 54 Anomalies, equally weighted, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.45 0.47 0.34 0.26 0.23
Average |t| 2.94 3.54 2.63 1.62 1.47
GRS40 6.38 7.19 6.25 4.80 4.55
p40 7.3×10
−26 8.7×10−30 3.9×10−25 7.8×10−18 1.6×10−16
GRS54 3.36 4.29 3.31 2.85 3.03
p54 3.6×10
−11 7.8×10−16 6.9×10−11 1.4×10−8 1.8×10−9
Number of min|α| - 6 4 21 23
Number of min|α|, q-4 vs. M-4 - - - 24 30
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Table B15
Models’ Abilities to Explain Each Other’s Factors, Annual-Data Factors for
Models FF-3, FF-5, and q-4 Reconstructed with Minimum Four-Month Gap
This table recomputes Table 7 after reconstructing factors in models FF-3, FF-5, and q-4 that use annual
data. A minimum gap of 4 months after the end of the fiscal year (instead of a gap of 6 to 18 months) is
required before using an annual variable in the factor construction, while using immediate prior-month values
of market capitalization. We apply this change to SMB and HML in model FF-3, to SMB, HML, RMW ,
and CMA in model FF-5, and to I/A in model q-4. Because the FF-5 factor CMA then becomes identical
to the q-4 factor I/A, we omit the comparisons involving those factors. Panel A reports a factor’s estimated
monthly alpha (in percent) with respect to each of the other models (with White (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent t-statistics in parentheses). Panel B computes the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (1989) F -test of whether
a given model produces zero alphas for the factors of an alternative model(with p-values in parentheses).
The models considered are the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5, which includes
the factors HML, RMW , and CMA; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4,
which includes the factors I/A and ROE; and the four-factor mispricing-factor model, denoted M-4, which
includes the factors MGMT and PERF . The sample period is from January 1967 through December 2013
(564 months).
Alpha computed with respect to model
Factors FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: Alpha (t-statistic)
Factors in FF-5
HML - -0.01 -0.07
(-0.10) (-0.69)
RMW - 0.10 0.15
(1.07) (1.61)
CMA - - -0.08
(-1.38)
Factors in q-4
I/A - - -0.08
(-1.38)
ROE 0.49 - 0.36
(5.92) (4.00)
Factors in M-4
MGMT 0.32 0.33 -
(5.53) (4.67)
PERF 0.64 0.24 -
(4.18) (1.55)
Panel B: GRS F -statistic (p-value)
HML, RMW , CMA - - 1.45
(0.23)
I/A, ROE - - 8.29
(2.8×10−4)
MGMT , PERF 28.84 16.88 -
(1.2×10−12) (7.7×10−8)
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Table B16
Summary Measures of Models’ Abilities to Explain Anomalies
Subsample 1: 1967–1990
This table recomputes Table 5 for the first subperiod. An anomaly is included in the subperiod analysis if it
satisfies the following three conditions: (i) the available data for the anomaly cover the entire sample period from
1967 to 2013, (ii) the estimated FF-3 long-short alpha for the anomaly has the same sign in the early and late
subperiods, and (iii) the FF-3 alpha is significant at the one-sided 10% significance level in both subperiods.
Measure Unadjusted FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: 10 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.59 0.57 0.44 0.34 0.08
Average |t| 2.81 3.17 2.97 1.90 0.44
GRS10 5.45 6.04 2.94 2.28 0.32
p10 2.2×10
−7 2.7×10−8 1.6×10−3 0.01 0.98
Number of min|α| - 0 2 0 8
Panel B: 29 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.53 0.66 0.36 0.28 0.31
Average |t| 2.38 3.52 2.19 1.48 1.46
GRS29 4.56 5.06 3.70 2.52 2.41
p29 1.0×10
−11 2.4×10−13 8.4×10−9 6.7×10−5 1.5×10−4
Number of min|α| - 0 8 10 11
Panel C: 38 Anomalies, equally weighted, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.67 0.67 0.36 0.37 0.30
Average |t| 3.47 4.39 2.62 2.17 1.68
GRS38 9.23 9.16 7.28 5.48 5.85
p38 5.6×10
−30 1.3×10−29 1.8×10−23 4.1×10−17 1.8×10−18
Number of min|α| - 0 11 10 17
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Table B17
Summary Measures of Models’ Abilities to Explain Anomalies
Subsample 2: 1991–2013
This table recomputes Table 5 for the second subperiod. An anomaly is included in the subperiod analysis if it
satisfies the following three conditions: (i) the available data for the anomaly cover the entire sample period from
1967 to 2013, (ii) the estimated FF-3 long-short alpha for the anomaly has the same sign in the early and late
subperiods, and (iii) the FF-3 alpha is significant at the one-sided 10% significance level in both subperiods.
Measure Unadjusted FF-3 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: 10 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.46 0.60 0.44 0.38 0.20
Average |t| 2.01 2.94 2.97 1.94 1.08
GRS10 3.54 5.38 2.99 3.44 1.43
p10 2.1×10
−4 3.0×10−7 1.4×10−3 3.0×10−4 0.17
Number of min|α| - 0 0 1 9
Panel B: 29 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.35 0.60 0.36 0.22 0.24
Average |t| 1.40 2.57 2.19 0.91 0.91
GRS29 2.09 2.24 1.47 1.62 1.28
p29 1.4×10
−3 5.0×10−4 0.06 0.03 0.16
Number of min|α| - 1 5 11 12
Panel C: 38 Anomalies, equally weighted, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.48 0.64 0.36 0.20 0.19
Average |t| 1.85 2.98 2.62 0.96 0.80
GRS38 3.34 3.97 2.91 2.94 2.66
p38 8.4×10
−9 3.2×10−11 4.6×10−7 3.4×10−7 3.9×10−6
Number of min|α| - 0 6 13 19
18
Table B18
Abilities of Models FF-5, q-4, and M-4 to Explain Each Other’s Factors
Subsample 1: 1967–1990
This table recomputes Table 7 for the first subperiod. Panel A reports a factor’s estimated monthly alpha (in
percent) with respect to each of the other models (with White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics
in parentheses). Panel B computes the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (1989) F -test of whether a given model produces
zero alphas for the factors of an alternative model (with p-values in parentheses). The factors whose alphas
are tested are those other than a model’s market and size factors. The models considered are the five-factor
model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5, which includes the factors HML, RMW , and CMA; the
four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4, which includes the factors I/A and ROE;
and the four-factor mispricing-factor model, denoted M-4, which includes the factors MGMT and PERF .
Alpha computed with respect to model
Factors FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: Alpha (t-statistic)
Factors in FF-5
HML - 0.38 0.01
(3.45) (0.07)
RMW - 0.21 0.24
(2.51) (2.84)
CMA - 0.01 -0.09
(0.22) (-1.37)
Factors in q-4
I/A 0.22 - 0.12
(4.98) (1.71)
ROE 0.78 - 0.69
(7.27) (6.33)
Factors in M-4
MGMT 0.28 0.47 -
(3.93) (5.01)
PERF 0.69 0.27 -
(3.81) (1.47)
Panel B: GRS F -statistic (p-value)
HML, RMW , CMA - 7.01 2.67
(1.5×10−4) (0.05)
I/A, ROE 29.90 - 19.34
(1.7×10−12) (1.4×10−8)
MGMT , PERF 17.49 14.87 -
(6.9×10−8) (7.3×10−7)
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Table B19
Abilities of Models FF-5, q-4, and M-4 to Explain Each Other’s Factors
Subsample 2: 1991–2013
This table recomputes Table 7 for the second subperiod. Panel A reports a factor’s estimated monthly alpha
(in percent) with respect to each of the other models (with White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-
statistics in parentheses). Panel B computes the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (1989) F -test of whether a given
model produces zero alphas for the factors of an alternative model (with p-values in parentheses). The factors
whose alphas are tested are those other than a model’s market and size factors. The models considered are
the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5, which includes the factors HML, RMW ,
and CMA; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4, which includes the factors
I/A and ROE; and the four-factor mispricing-factor model, denoted M-4, which includes the factors MGMT
and PERF .
Alpha computed with respect to model
Factors FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: Alpha (t-statistic)
Factors in FF-5
HML - -0.10 0.00
(-0.59) (-0.01)
RMW - 0.15 0.25
(1.24) (1.95)
CMA - 0.07 0.01
(1.15) (0.07)
Factors in q-4
I/A 0.03 - 0.05
(0.53) (0.50)
ROE 0.30 - 0.25
(2.62) (1.99)
Factors in M-4
MGMT 0.29 0.34 -
(2.51) (2.65)
PERF 0.61 0.48 -
(2.62) (2.05)
Panel B: GRS F -statistic (p-value)
HML, RMW , CMA - 2.18 1.62
(0.09) (0.18)
I/A, ROE 3.25 - 2.07
(0.04) (0.13)
MGMT , PERF 7.38 7.24 -
(7.6×10−4) (8.6×10−4)
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Table B20
Summary Measures of the Abilities of a Model with a Single
Mispricing Factor to Explain Anomalies
Subsample 1: 1967–1990
This table recomputes Table 9 for the first subperiod. An anomaly is included in the subperiod analysis if it
satisfies the following three conditions: (i) the available data for the anomaly cover the entire sample period
from 1967 to 2013, (ii) the estimated FF-3 long-short alpha for the anomaly has the same sign in the early
and late subperiods, and (iii) the FF-3 alpha is significant at the one-sided 10% significance level in both
subperiods.
Panel A: 10 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.15
Average |t| 0.72
GRS10 0.58
p10 0.83
Panel B: 29 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.29
Average |t| 1.35
GRS29 2.56
p29 4.7×10
−5
Panel C: 38 Anomalies, equally weighted,
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.37
Average |t| 1.90
GRS38 5.88
p38 1.3×10
−18
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Table B21
Summary Measures of the Abilities of a Model with a Single
Mispricing Factor to Explain Anomalies
Subsample 2: 1991–2013
This table recomputes Table 9 for the second subperiod. An anomaly is included in the subperiod analysis
if it satisfies the following three conditions: (i) the available data for the anomaly cover the entire sample
period from 1967 to 2013, (ii) the estimated FF-3 long-short alpha for the anomaly has the same sign in the
early and late subperiods, and (iii) the FF-3 alpha is significant at the one-sided 10% significance level in both
subperiods.
Panel A: 10 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.30
Average |t| 1.24
GRS10 1.53
p10 0.13
Panel B: 29 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.35
Average |t| 1.12
GRS29 1.44
p29 0.07
Panel C: 38 Anomalies, equally weighted,
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.32
Average |t| 1.13
GRS38 2.51
p38 1.4×10
−5
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Table B22
Abilities of Models FF-5, q-4, and M-3 to Explain Each Other’s Factors
Subsample 1: 1967–1990
This table recomputes Table 10 for the first subperiod. Panel A reports a factor’s estimated monthly alpha
(in percent) with respect to each of the other models (with White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-
statistics in parentheses). Panel B computes the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (1989) F -test of whether a given
model produces zero alphas for the factors of an alternative model (with p-values in parentheses). The factors
whose alphas are tested are those other than a model’s market and size factors. The models considered are
the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5, which includes the factors HML, RMW ,
and CMA; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4, which includes the factors
I/A and ROE; and the three-factor mispricing factor model, denoted M-3, which includes the factor UMO.
Alpha computed with respect to model
Factors FF-5 q-4 M-3
Panel A: Alpha (t-statistic)
Factors in FF-5
HML - 0.38 0.27
(3.45) (1.60)
RMW - 0.21 0.18
(2.51) (1.75)
CMA - 0.01 0.01
(0.22) (0.09)
Factors in q-4
I/A 0.22 - 0.20
(4.98) (1.94)
ROE 0.78 - 0.54
(7.27) (3.82)
Factor in M-3
UMO 0.71 0.53 -
(5.57) (3.87)
Panel B: GRS F -statistic (p-value)
HML, RMW , CMA - 7.01 4.20
(1.5×10−4) (6.3×10−3)
I/A, ROE 29.90 - 13.77
(1.7×10−12) (2.0×10−6)
UMO 40.60 18.69 -
(7.6×10−10) (2.1×10−5)
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Table B23
Abilities of Models FF-5, q-4, and M-3 to Explain Each Other’s Factors
Subsample 2: 1991–2013
This table recomputes Table 10 for the second subperiod. Panel A reports a factor’s estimated monthly
alpha (in percent) with respect to each of the other models (with White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent
t-statistics in parentheses). Panel B computes the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (1989) F -test of whether a given
model produces zero alphas for the factors of an alternative model (with p-values in parentheses). The factors
whose alphas are tested are those other than a model’s market and size factors. The models considered are
the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5, which includes the factors HML, RMW ,
and CMA; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a), denoted q-4, which includes the factors
I/A and ROE; and the three-factor mispricing factor model, denoted M-3, which includes the factor UMO.
Alpha computed with respect to model
Factors FF-5 q-4 M-3
Panel A: Alpha (t-statistic)
Factors in FF-5
HML - -0.10 0.32
(-0.59) (1.47)
RMW - 0.15 0.25
(1.24) (1.88)
CMA - 0.07 0.15
(1.15) (1.16)
Factors in q-4
I/A 0.03 - 0.19
(0.53) (1.39)
ROE 0.30 - 0.10
(2.62) (0.73)
Factor in M-3
UMO 0.74 0.69 -
(4.54) (4.25)
Panel B: GRS F -statistic (p-value)
HML, RMW , CMA - 2.18 1.48
(0.09) (0.22)
I/A, ROE 3.25 - 1.49
(0.04) (0.23)
UMO 23.68 22.48 -
(1.9×10−6) (3.4×10−6)
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Table B24
Abilities of Models M-3 and M-4 to Explain Each Other’s Factors
Subsample 1: 1967–1990
This table recomputes Table 11 for the first subperiod. Panel A reports a factor’s estimated monthly alpha
(in percent) with respect to each of the other models (with White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-
statistics in parentheses). Panel B computes the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (1989) F -test of whether a given
model produces zero alphas for the factors of an alternative model (with p-values in parentheses). The factors
whose alphas are tested are those other than a model’s market and size factors. The models considered are
the three-factor mispricing factor model, denoted M-3, which includes the factor UMO, and the four-factor
mispricing-factor model, denoted M-4, which includes the factors MGMT and PERF .
Alpha computed with respect to model
Factors M-3 M-4
Panel A: Alpha (t-statistic)
Factor in M-3
UMO - 0.15
(2.46)
Factors in M-4
MGMT 0.24 -
(1.80)
PERF -0.15 -
(-0.90)
Panel B: GRS F -statistic (p-value)
UMO - 5.20
(0.02)
MGMT , PERF 2.26 -
(0.11)
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Table B25
Abilities of Models M-3 and M-4 to Explain Each Other’s Factors
Subsample 2: 1991–2013
This table recomputes Table 11 for the second subperiod. Panel A reports a factor’s estimated monthly
alpha (in percent) with respect to each of the other models (with White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent
t-statistics in parentheses). Panel B computes the Gibbons-Ross-Shanken (1989) F -test of whether a given
model produces zero alphas for the factors of an alternative model (with p-values in parentheses). The factors
whose alphas are tested are those other than a model’s market and size factors. The models considered are
the three-factor mispricing factor model, denoted M-3, which includes the factor UMO, and the four-factor
mispricing-factor model, denoted M-4, which includes the factors MGMT and PERF .
Alpha computed with respect to model
Factors M-3 M-4
Panel A: Alpha (t-statistic)
Factor in M-3
UMO - 0.23
(3.76)
Factors in M-4
MGMT 0.29 -
(1.67)
PERF -0.45 -
(-2.57)
Panel B: GRS F -statistic (p-value)
UMO - 15.49
(1.1×10−4)
MGMT , PERF 4.08 -
(0.02)
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Table B26
Comparing Additional Factor Models
The table reports summary statistics for alphas computed under six different factor models: the three-factor
model of Fama and French (1993), denoted FF-3; the four-factor momentum model of Carhart (1997), denoted
MOM-4; the four-factor liquidity-risk model of Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003), denoted LIQ-4; the five-factor
model of Fama and French (2015), denoted FF-5; the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015a),
denoted q-4; and the four-factor mispricing-factor model introduced in this study, denoted M-4. The table
reports each model’s average absolute monthly (percent) alpha, average absolute t-statistic, the F -statistic and
associated p-value for the “GRS” test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989), and the number of anomalies
for which the model produces the smallest absolute alpha among the models being compared in the table. In
Panel A, two versions of the GRS test are reported. Data for the distress anomaly begin in October 1974, and
data for the return-on-assets anomaly begin in November 1971. The other ten anomalies begin at the start of
the sample period, which is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564 months). GRS10 tests whether
the ten alphas for the full-sample anomalies equal zero, while GRS12 uses all 12 anomalies and begins the
sample in October 1974. Panels B and C also report two versions of the GRS test: GRS51 uses 51 anomalies
whose data are available by January 1967, while GRS72 use those anomalies plus 21 others whose data are
available by February 1986.
FF-3 MOM-4 LIQ-4 FF-5 q-4 M-4
Panel A: 12 Anomalies (value-weighted, NYSE deciles)
Average |α| 0.67 0.46 0.66 0.45 0.34 0.18
Average |t| 4.40 3.52 4.34 2.84 2.31 1.29
GRS10 9.67 7.21 9.34 6.23 5.56 1.62
p10 6.5×10
−15 9.9×10−11 2.4×10−14 4.8×10−9 6.6×10−8 0.10
GRS12 7.71 6.09 7.77 4.17 3.95 1.88
p12 4.2×10
−13 6.2×10−10 3.2×10−13 3.1×10−6 8.3×10−6 0.03
Number of min|α| 0 0 0 1 2 9
Panel B: 73 Anomalies, value-weighted, NYSE deciles
Average |α| 0.44 0.30 0.44 0.29 0.20 0.18
Average |t| 2.69 1.92 2.72 1.74 1.13 1.00
GRS51 2.60 2.11 2.64 1.95 1.72 1.36
p51 6.7×10
−8 2.7×10−5 3.9×10−8 1.8×10−4 2.0×10−3 0.05
GRS72 2.10 1.96 2.15 1.79 1.78 1.54
p72 1.3×10
−5 7.0×10−5 6.8×10−6 5.3×10−4 5.8×10−4 8.1×10−3
Number of min|α| 4 6 5 5 21 32
Panel C: 73 Anomalies, equally weighted, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ deciles
Average |α| 0.52 0.35 0.52 0.34 0.23 0.22
Average |t| 3.63 2.52 3.68 2.37 1.41 1.38
GRS51 6.11 5.46 6.09 4.97 4.12 4.14
p51 1.2×10
−28 7.5×10−25 1.8×10−28 5.9×10−22 7.1×10−17 5.9×10−17
GRS72 3.25 3.06 3.18 2.64 2.41 2.68
p72 3.0×10
−12 4.1×10−11 7.9×10−12 1.1×10−8 2.3×10−07 6.2×10−9
Number of min|α| 3 7 4 7 24 28
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Figure B1. Rolling comparisons of average absolute alpha for 12 value-weighted
anomalies. The 12 anomalies are the same as those in Panel A of Table 5. The plot displays
the difference between the anomalies’ average absolute alpha under model M-4 and the average
under model FF-5 (solid line) and model q-4 (dashed line). Alphas are computed over 30-year
subperiods ending at each month plotted. The overall sample period is from January 1967 through
December 2013 (564 months)
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Figure B2. Rolling comparisons of average absolute alpha for 29 value-weighted
anomalies. The 29 anomalies consist of the subset of the 73 anomalies in Panel B of Table 5
that (i) have complete data for the overall sample period and (ii) in each half of that period pro-
duce a FF-3 alpha that is significant at a one-tailed 10% significance level. (The objective is to
analyze only anomalies that are robust over the entire sample period.) The plot displays the dif-
ference between the anomalies’ average absolute alpha under model M-4 and the average under
model FF-5 (solid line) and model q-4 (dashed line). Alphas are computed over 30-year subperiods
ending at each month plotted. The overall sample period is from January 1967 through December
2013 (564 months)
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Figure B3. Rolling comparisons of average absolute alpha for 38 equally weighted
anomalies. The 38 anomalies consist of the subset of the 73 anomalies in Panel C of Table 5 that
(i) have complete data for the overall sample period and (ii) in each half of that period produce a
FF-3 alpha that is significant at a one-tailed 10% significance level. (The objective is to analyze
only anomalies that are robust over the entire sample period.) The plot displays the difference
between the anomalies’ average absolute alpha under model M-4 and the average under model FF-
5 (solid line) and model q-4 (dashed line). Alphas are computed over 30-year subperiods ending at
each month plotted. The overall sample period is from January 1967 through December 2013 (564
months)
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